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ABSTRACT 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States and its partners around the world have 
significantly damaged al Qaeda’s organizational structure, transforming what was once a 
robust terrorist network into one that is disaggregated and much less effective.  Despite 
losing a considerable portion of its leadership in the war on terror, al Qaeda remains 
supportive of insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it continues to perpetuate the 
Salafi-Jihadi ideology throughout the Middle East and beyond.  As we continue to pursue 
a strategy aimed to further dismantle al Qaeda’s leadership, we must consider, what 
happens if we succeed? What should we expect to happen to the central organization if 
we kill or capture top-tier al Qaeda leadership such as Ayman al-Zawahiri or Osama bin 
Laden? Will the organization continue to be a threat without a recognizable leader? This 
research seeks to examine under what conditions a social movement organization will be 
effective without a leader.  Advisors and scholars alike have dichotomous opinions 
regarding the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations.  Social 
movement theorists have yet to examine leaderless organizations through the lens of their 
models.  By examining leaderless social movement organizations in terms of the political 
process model, we will gain a better understanding of why leaderless structures may be 
more effective for some organizations and less effective for others.  This research will 
expand the existing body of social movement literature and provide a theory for 
predicting the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
But al Qaeda became powerful because bin Laden never took a traditional leadership 
role.1 
 
In many ways, Leaderless Resistance is a last-ditch effort to keep a struggle alive in the 
face of an overwhelming opposition.2 
 
The leaderless jihad should be allowed to expire on its own.3 
 
A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the conditions under which leaderless 
social movement organizations are more or less effective.  The term “leaderless” is a 
misnomer; all organizations have a leader to one degree or another.  However, the degree 
to which the leader plays a role in everyday operations of the organization may vary.  
Leaders typically provide inspiration and/or operational direction for social movement 
organizations.4  Inspiration is provided through a combination of charisma and ideology, 
or a body of doctrine that guides the organization.5  The inspirational leader also frames 
the ideology to the culture by linking the organization’s identity, grievances, and 
proposed solutions to cultural norms.  Operational direction includes the planning and 
coordination of ways and means to achieve tactical and strategic objectives.6  Sometimes 
the inspirational leader is also the operational leader; sometimes they are two different 
people. This paper refers to “leaderless” social movement organizations as those in which 
                                                 
1Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider:  The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations (New York: Portfolio, 2006), 6.   
2 Simson Garfinkel, “Leaderless Resistance Today,” First Monday 8, no. 3 (March 3, 2003), 
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1040/961. 
3 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 146. 
4 Michael Freeman, “The Headless Horseman: A Theoretical and Strategic Assessment of Leadership 




the leader or leaders exercise a low degree of operational direction.  This paper will 
introduce a theory that explains the potential effectiveness of leaderless social movement 
organizations and discusses methods for countering them. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In 2006, the publication of the bestselling book The Starfish and the Spider: The 
Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations challenged businesses to rethink their 
leadership strategies and organizational structures.  Leaderless organizational structure 
was nothing new, but due to its overwhelming popularity, the book likely influenced 
many in and out of government who were concerned with combating terrorism.  The U.S. 
had been fairly successful decapitating the leadership of terrorist groups during the first 
five years of the war on terror, in essence transforming them into leaderless 
organizations.  Could the leaderless concepts articulated by authors Ori Brafman and Rod 
Beckstrom apply to terrorist organizations?  If so, then the U.S. decapitation strategy 
could have the deleterious effect of spawning an “unstoppable power.”   
Opinions regarding the effectiveness of leaderless social movement organizations 
are dichotomous.  Some argue that leaderless social movement organizations are the next 
great threat—that they are more effective than organizations that have a clear leader.7  
Others argue that they are less effective, that social movement organizations that adopt 
leaderless strategies do so as a “last ditch effort”8 to keep the organization alive.9  None 
explain the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations are more or 
less effective.  None have analyzed leaderless social movement organizations in terms of 
social movement theory. 
                                                 
7 William S. Lind, “On War #241,” The Free Congress Commentary, November 13, 2007, 
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/files/on-war-series-241-205.pdf; David Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency 
Redux,” Small Wars Journal (2008), http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/kilcullen1.pdf. 
8 Garfinkel, “Leaderless Resistance Today.”  
9 Peter Bergen, “The Status of Al Qaeda: The Organization Today and the Outlook Over the Next Five 
Years,” The Aspen Institute, 2008, 
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/docs/pubs/Bergen_Paper.pdf; Bron Taylor, 
“Religion, Violence and Radical Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the Earth 
Liberation Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 10, Issue 4  (Winter 1998): 1–42. 
 3 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Under what conditions is a leaderless social movement organization likely to be 
more or less effective?   This paper will attempt to provide an answer in terms of social 
movement theory.  Examining this question through the lens of social movement theory’s 
political process model will provide a more nuanced understanding of why one leaderless 
social movement organization may be more or less effective than another.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on leaderless social movement organizations is best grouped into 
three broad categories.  Counterterrorism advisors have written books and articles on the 
future terrorist threat and publicly debated their differences, and their implications are 
rather narrow.10  Scholars, on the other hand, have written about the utility of “leaderless 
resistance” as an organization strategy and attempted to relate the old term to today’s 
threat, but they have not done so in terms of social movement theory, which is well tested 
and most useful for analyzing social movements and their organizations.11  Finally, social 
movement theorists have written about organizational structure but have not gone so far 
                                                 
10 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 200;  Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux”; Bruce  Hoffman, Inside 
Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 432; Elaine E. Sciolino and E. Schmitt, “The 
Nation - A Not very Private Feud Over Terrorism,” New York Times Week in Review, June 8, 2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/08/weekinreview/08sciolino.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=marc+sageman&st=
nyt. 
11 Garfinkel, “Leaderless Resistance Today”; Gary A. Ackerman, “Beyond Arson? A Threat 
Assessment of the Earth Liberation Front,” Terrorism & Political Violence 15, no. 4 (Oct–Dec, 2003): 
143–170; Paul Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation 
Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 (Fall, 2007): 351–368; Jeffrey J. Kaplan, “Leaderless 
Resistance,” Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 3, (Fall 1997): 80–95; Stefan H. Leader and Peter 
Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, 
no. 4 (2003): 37–58; Jeremy Pressman, “Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat?” Current History 102, 
no. 668 (December, 2003): 422–425. 
 4 
as to analyze “leaderless” social movement organizations.12  There is a clear gap in the 
literature that fails to explain the threat posed by leaderless social movement 
organizations in terms of models provided by social movement theory. 
Within the last year, U.S. counterterrorism advisors have debated the current 
status of al Qaeda and the future threat it may pose.  William Lind of the Free Congress 
Foundation claims that al Qaeda has adopted the leaderless model13 and David Kilcullen 
asserts that “today’s insurgents often employ diffuse, cell-based structures and ‘leaderless 
resistance.’”14  These advisors write of leaderless organizations as if they pose new and 
greater challenges, but they do so entrenched within an organization employing a 
decapitation strategy that is only effective so long as it is targeting organizations that 
have a leader.  Simply because a terrorist organization adopts a leaderless strategy and 
becomes more difficult to target does not make it a more potent threat.  
Two prominent advisors to the U.S. administration, Marc Sageman and Bruce 
Hoffman, have publicly disagreed about the future threat of al Qaeda.  In his book 
Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century, Marc Sageman argues 
that the terrorist threat we face today looks very different than the one we faced on 
September 11, 2001.  According to Sageman:  
The present threat has evolved from a structured group of al Qaeda 
masterminds, controlling vast resources issuing commands, to a multitude 
of informal local groups trying to emulate their predecessors by 
                                                 
12 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” in Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. Mario 
Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2003), 281; Doug McAdam, 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982); Florence Passy, “Social Networks Matter. But how?” in Social Movements and Networks: 
Relational Approaches to Collective Action, eds. M. Diani and D. McAdam (Oxford, England: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 21; Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious 
Politics (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Mario Diani, “Networks and Social 
Movements: A Research Programme,” in Social Movements and Networks : Relational Approaches to 
Collective Action, eds. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
299. 
13 Lind, “On War #241.” 
14 Kilcullen, “Counterinsurgency Redux,” 7. 
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conceiving and executing operations from the bottom up.  These…form a 
scattered global network, a leaderless jihad.15 
He concludes that “without direction (al Qaeda) cannot coalesce into a political 
organization able to govern a country.  It can be a terrorist network and nothing more.”16  
Bruce Hoffman disagrees, and has written that that the al Qaeda organization remains 
very much intact, and that it has relocated and reconstituted new leadership within 
existing structures.17  The disagreement between these advisors highlights two things: 1) 
confusion abounds at the highest levels over the actual status of the enemy in the war on 
terror, and 2) that scholars have not sufficiently analyzed leaderless organizations on a 
continuous scale of varying levels of effectiveness.  
In fact, other leaderless social movement organizations do exist and they have 
achieved varying degrees of effectiveness.  Sageman refers to al Qaeda as a social 
movement and al Qaeda Central as a social movement organization,18  but al Qaeda 
Central is but one organization within the broader Salafi-Jihad social movement that he 
describes in his 2004 book, Understanding Terror Networks.19  Sageman says nothing 
about the leaderless social movement organizations that have been effective.  While 
Sageman is essentially correct in his assessment that al Qaeda Central is a leaderless 
organization in decline and that they cannot govern effectively, the implications he draws 
narrowly fit the al Qaeda terrorist network.  By limiting his analysis to this single 
network Sageman limits his potential policy implications.  Furthermore, Sageman is 
unable to distinguish the variables that explain the effectiveness of leaderless social 
movement organizations.  Counterterrorism experts are not alone in their insufficient 
explanations. 
Scholars have written sparsely about “leaderless resistance,” its history and 
application in the radical environmental and white separatist movements.  “Leaderless 
                                                 
15 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, vii. 
16 Ibid., 144. 
17 See Sciolino and Schmitt, “The Nation - A Not Very Private Feud Over Terrorism.” 
18 Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 200. 
19 See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2004). 
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Resistance” is an organizational strategy first articulated in 1953 by Colonel Ulius 
Amoss, an officer in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II.20  
“Amoss was frustrated that the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies were using 
outdated methods to build resistance against communism in Eastern Europe”.21  Anti-
communist resistance cells in Europe were being infiltrated by Soviet intelligence 
agencies, and Amoss advocated for what he called “leaderless resistance” throughout 
Eastern Europe in order to subvert Soviet occupation.22  Amoss suggested:  
We do not need ‘leaders’; we need leading ideas. These ideas would 
produce leaders. The masses would produce them and the ideas would be 
their inspiration. Therefore, we must create these ideas and convey them 
to the restless peoples concerned with them.23  
Many scholars and advisors, including Sageman, have erroneously attributed the 
concept of leaderless resistance to Louis Beam, a Texas Ku Klux Klan leader, and Aryan 
Nation activist.  In his 1983 essay entitled “Leaderless Resistance,” Beam highlighted the 
disadvantages of a pyramidal organization structure, namely the ease by which law 
enforcement could execute a discriminate repression and decapitation strategy to 
dismantle the organization.24  His solution for overcoming these disadvantages was the 
concept of leaderless resistance, in which he advocated for “phantom cells” to cooperate 
with each other, absent communication and central direction.25  Leaderless organizations 
rely on influential members to perpetuate an ideology and frame it to the culture, but they 
do not require a leader to strategize, plan, and coordinate attacks.  Beam stressed that in a 
leaderless organization it was incumbent upon the individual to “acquire the necessary 
skills and information as to what is to be done.”26  Beam clearly emphasizes the 
                                                 









inspirational leadership over the operational, but he was unable to successfully propagate 
the strategy within the white separatist movement. 
In his analysis of Beam’s essay, Jeremy Pressman highlights two assumptions 
inherent within the leaderless resistance strategy:  1) multiple people hold common views 
and are willing to act on them in a violent manner 2) the strategy depends on a 
demonstration effect to mobilize others to act.27  These assumptions allude to the 
structural and ideological factors inherent in social movement theory.  Mobilizing 
structures and strategic framing are two key variables that facilitate growth in social 
movement organizations.28  Mobilization under a leaderless resistance strategy results 
when “idealists truly committed to the cause” act on their own volition or “take their cue 
from others who precede them.”29  Inspirational leaders frame the movement’s identity, 
problem, and solution through a variety of means in order to persuade individuals to act, 
“keep people informed of events” and allow “for a planned response that will take many 
variations.”30  The actions that members or potential members read about and see on 
television and/or the internet motivate them to act.  While these scholars have examined 
leaderless social movement organizations that have been effective, they have not 
analyzed them explicitly in terms social movement theory, which is most useful for 
analyzing the cycle of contentious politics or the origin, mobilization, and spread of 
social movements. 
Finally, social movement theorists have written extensively about networks and 
their impact on organizational effectiveness, as well as the significance of framing31 an 
                                                 
27 Pressman, “Leaderless Resistance: The Next Threat?” 422. 
28 McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of Social 
Movements,” 281. 
29 Beam, “Leaderless Resistance,” 4. 
30 Ibid. 
31 David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford Jr., Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame 
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, 
no. 4 (Aug., 1986): 464; According to Snow et al., “the term ‘frame’ is borrowed from Goffman (1974:21) 
to denote ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enable individuals ‘to locate, perceive, identify, and label’ 
occurrences within their life space and the world at large.  By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, 
frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective. So 
conceptualized, it follows that frame alignment is a necessary condition for movement participation, 
whatever its nature or intensity.”   
 8 
organization’s ideology and goals, but they have not gone so far as to analyze leaderless 
organizations.32  Social movement theory provides an excellent scientific framework for 
analyzing all social movement organizations.  By not examining leaderless social 
movement organizations in particular, theorists have not demonstrated the unique 
characteristics of specific variables that explain how leaderless social movement 
organizations mobilize individuals to act collectively.  Absent analysis in terms of social 
movement theory, potential policy implications remain unfounded.  This paper analyzes 
leaderless social movement organizations in terms of social movement theory in order to 
justify wide-ranging future policy implications of potential threats. 
E. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We test our hypotheses through the lens of social movement theory’s political 
process model.  The political process model combines four variables into a causal 
framework that explains the emergence and development of social movements.33  
Collective action begins with grievances, and the extent to which a movement mobilizes 
depends on the political opportunity structures available for individuals to express their 
grievances, mobilizing structures within which individuals may organize to act 
collectively, and strategic frames that link movement ideology to the culture and 
motivate collectivities to act on behalf of the movement.34 
All social movements arise out of a set of grievances.  The strategies available for 
movements to express their grievances and bring about change depend in part on the 
socio political characteristics of the environment in which they exist.  Political 
opportunities available to social movements may vary from open, democratic forms of 
government, with institutions available for people to assemble and voice their grievances, 
to closed, or authoritarian systems of government in which opposition to government is 
considered a crime.  These opportunities often determine the tactics that an organization 
                                                 
32 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 464–
481. 
33 Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social 
Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, (Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 2. 
34 Ibid. 
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uses to bring about change, and also the tactics that the government may use to repress 
them.  Social movement organizations structure themselves to take advantage of existing 
networks and mobilize the population. 
Existing social networks provide established structures within which a new 
organization may recruit and mobilize members.  Mobilizing structures may include 
professional associations, student and recreational organizations, or even government 
institutions.  Movement leaders and members take advantage of the contacts they make 
through these existing networks to spread their message, recruit, and activate the 
population. 
Social movement organizations strategically frame their ideology to achieve a 
high degree of resonance with cultural norms.35  They solicit empathy from the 
population when framing the problem.  Prognostic frames, or the solution and tactics, 
follow directly from the diagnosis and are heralded as the only way to achieve movement 
goals.  They maintain these frames by continually adapting them to cultural norms.  They 
motivate individuals to act through a variety of techniques, to include appeals to religious 
fundamentals, morality, fear, Manichaeism, and millenarianism. 
All of these variables can help to explain how social movement organizations 
mobilize individuals to act collectively, but they are not sufficient for explaining 
organization effectiveness.  In this paper, we examine specific aspects of political 
opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and strategic framing, within organizations 
that have varying degrees of operational leadership, to explain the conditions under 
which “leaderless” social movement organization are more or less effective. 
1. Effectiveness 
In his 1975 book The Strategy of Social Protest, William A. Gamson assesses the 
effectiveness of social movement organizations.36  Given countless variables that could 
affect social movement organizations, this is not an easy task, which explains why few 
                                                 
35 Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” 477. 
36 See William A. Gamson, The Strategy of Social Protest, The Dorsey series in sociology, 
(Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1975). 
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have attempted to assess social movement organization effectiveness since.  Building 
upon Gamson’s work, however, Rachel Einwohner developed seven indicators that 
helped her assess the effectiveness of two local-level animal rights campaigns of the mid-
1980s.37  One might think that goal achievement explains an organization’s effectiveness, 
but goal achievement is not a sufficient indicator of success in and of itself; organizations 
may be highly effective in changing structural institutions or society’s attitudes without 
ever achieving their stated goals.  In this paper, effectiveness is assessed between two 
actors:  the leaderless social movement organization and its target, which may be the 
state, private corporations, or society.  This paper uses Einwohner’s seven indicators to 
assess six social movement organizations. 
 
Figure 1.   Social Movement Organization Effectiveness 
The seven indicators depicted in Figure 1 should be considered on a spectrum of 
varying degrees of effectiveness.  1) Has the organization taken action against the target?  
We are particularly concerned with violent action against the target.  Leaderless 
organizations abandon a hierarchical structure that produces operational direction for a 
reason; their actions are nearly always illegal and violent.  2) Has the target 
acknowledged the social movement organization as valid and relevant?  Has the target 
verbally indicated that the social movement organization is legitimate and is worthy of a 
response?  3) Has the target consulted with the social movement organization?  Has the 
target invited the social movement organization to negotiate a solution to remedy 
grievances?  4) Has the target made a concessional claim or promise to act in accordance 
                                                 
37 Rachel L. Einwohner, “Gender, Class, and Social Movement Outcomes: Identity and Effectiveness 
in Two Animal Rights Campaigns,” Gender and Society 13, no. 1 (February 1999): 56–76. 
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with the social movement organization demands?  5) Has the target changed its behavior 
in the direction desired by the organization?  6) Has the target complied exactly with the 
demands of the organization?  7) Has the social movement organization achieved its 
desired outcome or realized its overall goal?38  We assess these effectiveness indicators 
on social movement organizations within a variety of environments. 
2. State Capacity  
Social movement organizations pursue their goals within varying degrees of state 
capacity.  The environment in which a social movement organization operates is going to 
have some effect on the ability of that organization to achieve its goals.  In essence, the 
environment determines the political opportunity structures available to the social 
movement organization.  Political opportunity structures are a necessary but not a 
sufficient variable for social movements to achieve collective action.  Vince Boudreau 
provides a useful framework for examining the political opportunity structures available 
within a state.  Boudreau’s research is focused on answering why precarious states use 
disproportionate power to quell a movement.  According to Boudreau, the reaction of the 
state depends on both the capacity of the state and the capacity of the organization.  Our 
study of leaderless social movement organization effectiveness is concerned with more 
than precarious regimes, and less concerned with the proportionality of state responses, 
therefore what is most useful for us is Boudreau’s typology of state capacity. 
Boudreau expresses state capacity in terms of breadth and depth.  Breadth refers 
to how broadly diffused state authorities are across time and space, or the degree to which 
the government is present and has established its authority within the confines of the 
state.39  The state may be narrow, or present in only “enclaves of society,” or it may be 
broad and have penetrated both urban and rural areas.40  Depth, on the other hand, 
                                                 
38 Einwohner, “Gender, Class, and Social Movement Outcomes: Identity and Effectiveness in Two 
Animal Rights Campaigns,” 56–76. 
39  Vince Boudreau, “Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive 
Policy,” in Repression and Mobilization, eds. Davenport, Johnston and Mueller (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 33–57. 
40 Ibid. 
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describes the extent to which a state controls society.41  For example, states may be 
shallow, or “barely able to collect taxes,” or deep and able to “regulate intimate family 
relationships.”42  The state’s capacity in breadth and depth partly determines the 
organization’s ability to mobilize individuals to act collectively.43  Table 1 organizes 
Boudreau’s concept of state capacity in terms of breadth and depth. 
Table 1.   Boudreau’s Typology of State Capacity 
State Capacity 
Breadth – ability to exercise power 
simultaneously across territory 
Depth – ability to exercise power 
simultaneously across many aspects of 
life 
Definition Broad – broadly 
diffused across 




across time & 
space  
Shallow – little 
control over society  





power base  
-Penetrated & 
established 




in all areas  
-Support from 






in few areas  
-Barely able to 
collect taxes  
-Unable to regulate 
life  
-Few laws  
-Easily able to 
collect taxes  
-Regulate many 
aspects of life  
-Many laws  
 
We use several quantitative indicators to help classify states into one of the four 
possible combinations of breadth and depth.  The number of police per capita and the 
police density per square kilometer give us an indication of the breadth of the state.  
Police per capita and police density data is derived primarily from World Bank surveys 
taken during the time period that corresponds to our specific case studies.  For this time 
period we compute a median score among all countries that provided this data to the 
World Bank, and we use the median to define the break point between the shallow and 
                                                 
41 Boudreau, “Precarious Regimes,”  37. 




broad state.  For depth, we use tax effectiveness and law enforcement scores derived from 
World Bank surveys.  The median for the scores reported for all states during the specific 
time period defines a break point between shallow and deep states.  In addition to the 
quantitative method described here, we also make a qualitative assessment considering 
the context of the data and historical facts, and in some cases we refer to our experiences 
living within the subject state. 
According to Boudreau, states generally seek a balance of breadth and depth.  On 
the surface it would appear that the most challenging environment for social movement 
organizations would be one that is both broad and deep.  It is important to note that just 
because a state is narrow and shallow does not mean that it does not pose challenges for 
the social movement organization.  These states typically are building their capacity to 
extend the breadth and depth of their control and in doing so may pose significant 
problems for challengers.  For example, states that can easily collect taxes in enclaves of 
society might seek to increase their tax revenues by expanding their authority in 
previously ungoverned areas.44  Social challengers “require more crucial, more particular, 
and more specific responses” to shallow states within poorly consolidated areas.45  In all 
cases the state must decide who they can fight, who they can coopt, and who they can 
ignore.46  
Weak states must make a calculated decision on when to respond to social 
movement organizations.  They must consider the capacity of the organization, in terms 
of breadth and depth, and how formidable that organization is relative to state power.47  
According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, “the most serious challenge to a system of control 
based upon predictability and visibility is group work that does not conform to the logic 
of the system and instead remains outside state surveillance.”48  Wiktorowicz’ research 
                                                 
44  Boudreau, “Precarious Regimes and Matchup Problems in the Explanation of Repressive Policy,” 
36. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid., 37. 
48 Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,” 49. 
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on social movements in Jordan indicates that states try to channel collective action so 
they are visible within the breadth and depth of the state. 
How does the environment affect the organization’s ability to achieve our 
effectiveness indicators?  It is important to remember that antagonists for revolutionary 
movements may be different than antagonists for reform movements.  Antagonists for 
revolutionary movements are always state authorities.  Antagonists for reform 
movements may or may not be state authorities.  Reform movement organizations may 
target the state, corporations, or even private individuals.  State authorities, nevertheless, 
are responsible for maintaining control regardless of the type of social movement 
organization operating within its borders. 
The state’s capacity in breadth mostly affects the first two effectiveness indicators 
(contact and relevance).  A state that is broad will make it difficult for the social 
movement organization to take action against its antagonist.  The presence of state 
authorities throughout the state’s territory does not eliminate opportunities for the 
organization to commit violent acts but it does have a deterrent effect and may make it 
increasingly more difficult for the organization to execute their attacks.  Additionally, a 
broad state may acknowledge the social movement organization as valid and relevant.  If 
an organization has taken action against its antagonists amidst state authorities then it 
may be considered formidable.  The converse of both indicators is true as well. 
The state’s depth, on the other hand, affects the organizations ability to achieve all 
seven indicators.  The degree to which the state controls society not only determines the 
likelihood that a challenger will act collectively and be determined valid and relevant, but 
whether or not the state will coerce, channel, or concede to the social movement 
organization.  States that wish to increase their depth may be more likely to channel or 
concede to organizational demands depending on the type of government they employ.  
For example, pluralistic democracies that grant wide-ranging freedoms to their citizens 
may honestly wish to represent the people.  As India sought its independence from the 
British in the mid-1940s it tried to establish a form of government that addressed the 
grievances and concerns of those within the Hindu-Nationalist Movement.  In fact, the 
state’s desire to address these concerns was so strong that it led to the formation of 
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Pakistan.  On the other hand, tyrannical regimes may be less willing to negotiate and 
more willing to repress the citizenry.  The Chinese government’s response to the student 
movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989 is a good example.  Then there is the type of 
government we see more and more in third world countries, the authoritarian democratic 
government.  The leaders of these states routinely empower institutions only as much as 
is required to placate certain tribes or ethnicities.  As a result, institutions are weak and 
unable to address grievances from social movement organizations, and the state leader is 
the only individual with the power to address grievances.  These state leaders would also 
be less likely to negotiate with social movement organizations, unless they reasoned it 
was necessary to maintain their grip on power.    
Boudreau’s framework of state capacity helps us to determine the political 
opportunity structures available within a state and classify various states according to 
their capacity but political opportunity structures are only one variable that determines a 
social movement organization’s ability to mobilize.  We gain a better understanding of 
the impact that mobilizing structures and strategic framing have on organization 
effectiveness by closely examining the social movement organization’s leadership. 
3. Leadership 
In each case study we look at the overall structure of the organization, the 
organization’s connectivity to existing networks, and it’s inspirational and operational 
leadership.  These four indicators help us make a qualitative assessment about the degree 
of leadership within the organization.  They also expose the impact that mobilizing 
structures and strategic framing have on the effectiveness of each organization.  
Both inspirational and operational leaders use their organization’s structure and 
connectivity to existing networks for the greater goal of mobilizing individuals, but they 
have different sub-goals.  The inspirational leader seeks to frame the organization’s 
ideology to the culture, while the operational leader plans and coordinates a strategy for 
direct action that is consistent with the ideology.  
 16 
  
Figure 2.   Degree of Leadership 
Figure 2 depicts our concept of varying degrees of operational leadership.  Again, 
the inspirational and operational leader may or may not be the same person; in this paper 
we are concerned with the quantity of both types of leadership that exist within the 
organization.  There typically exists a high degree of inspirational leadership in both 
centralized and decentralized organizations; however, the degree to which the ideology or 
frames resonate with the population varies among organizations. Centralized or 
hierarchical organizations typically have a high degree of operational leadership as well.  
Decentralized or cellular type organizations, on the other hand, tend to rely on 
organization members to plan, coordinate, and even strategize for the organization.  
These we suggest have a low degree of operational direction. 
4. Theory 
This paper hypothesizes that the effectiveness of leaderless social movement 
organizations depends on the structural characteristics of the organization and the 
capacity of the state in which the organization operates.49   Political opportunity 
                                                 
49 The political process model provides a framework of multiple variables that can be used to explain 
the progression of social movement development.  Social movements may consist of one or a variety of 
social movement organizations that seek common goals to change social behavior.  The underlying premise 
of the political process model is that social change through social movement is “above all else a political 
rather than a psychological phenomenon.”  Movement mobilization, and thus organization mobilization, is 
dependent on the political opportunity structures available for individuals to express their grievances, 
mobilizing structures within which individuals may organize to act collectively, and strategic frames which 
link ideology to the culture and motivate collectivities to act on behalf of the movement.  See McAdam, 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 36. 
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structures are a function of state capacity.  More opportunities exist in states that have 
little capacity to control the population than in states that exercise a high degree of 
control over the population.  Some combinations of state capacity and organizational 
structure are more effective than others.  Centralized organizational structures have a 
high degree of operational leadership while decentralized structures have a low degree of 
operational leadership.  Social movement organizations operating in states that exercise a 
low degree of control over the population will be most effective if they are more 
centralized.  Centralized social movement organizations in permissive environments can 
take advantage of their hierarchical structure to mobilize individuals to act collectively.  
On the other hand, those organizations operating in states that exercise a high degree of 
control can be most effective if they are decentralized.  Social movement organizations 
that are decentralized remain resilient through very strong frames; frame resonance 
enhances a decentralized organization’s effectiveness in highly capable states.  
Furthermore, social movement organizations that operate in states that are developing, or 
increasing their capacity, require a combination of variables to become effective.  They 
must be relatively centralized, highly connected to existing networks, and maintain a high 
degree of frame resonance in order to be effective.  Figure 3 organizes these hypotheses 
into a typological theory explaining the conditions under which leaderless social 
movement organizations may be more or less effective.  
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Figure 3.   Leaderless Social Movement Organization Effectiveness  
Each cell in Figure 3 corresponds to a combination of breadth and depth and 
represents distinct political opportunities available to a social movement organization 
operating within that type of state.  In each type of state, effectiveness is a function of the 
degree to which the organization is centralized.  In the narrow and shallow state, social 
movement organization effectiveness increases as the degree of centralization within the 
organization increases.  Political opportunity structures, mobilizing structures, and 
strategic framing all contribute equally to the organization’s ability to mobilize.  In the 
broad and shallow state, social movement organization effectiveness also increases as the 
degree of centralization within the organization increases.  However, connectivity to 
existing networks and frame resonance are especially important in maintaining a 
centralized organizational structure capable of mobilizing individuals in these 
environments.  In the broad and deep state, social movement organization effectiveness 
increases as the degree of centralization within the organization decreases.  Social 
movement organizations in this environment require a high degree of frame resonance to 
mobilize individuals.  The narrow and deep cell is blank because we do not examine 
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cases in this environment.  Our research indicates that there are very few states with a 
narrow/deep capacity.  Typically developing states increase their presence and then 
increase their control over the population.  Although there may be a few cases, it is highly 
unusual for a state to exercise a high degree of control over the population without first 
establishing its authoritative presence throughout society.50   
F. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis demonstrates how an organization’s effectiveness varies according to 
the organization’s structure in a variety of environments.  This paper uses a combination 
of within-case methods and comparative methods to test the theory presented.51  Case 
study analysis provides empirical observations and degrees of variance across the 
theory’s variables.   
This paper examines six cases to test the theory.  The Environmental Movement 
and the Salafi-Jihad movement consist of organizations whose leadership exhibit varying 
degrees of operational direction.  We have chosen three organizations from each 
movement for study.  These organizations operate around the world and within a variety 
of state capacities.52  They are all illegal and organizations that use violent means to 
accomplish goals ranging from reform to revolutionary.   
Given both movements’ historical operations in a variety of environments, we 
compare two cases in three of the four environments of state capacity.  We expect to 
observe varying degrees of actual and relative effectiveness between each organization in 
each of the three categories of state capacity.  Ideally, observations of differing degrees of 
                                                 
50 Chile (~2002)  is perhaps the best example of a narrow/deep state.  Chile had 193 police per 
100,000 people (median 288) and a police density of 0.04 (median 0.31) in 2002, which qualifies it as 
narrow.  Chile had a law enforcement score of 75 (median 60) and tax effectiveness score of 100 (median 
88) between 2004–2009 qualifying it as deep.  The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data 
Portal,” accessed November 15, 2010, https://www.agidata.org. 
51 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett the combination of these methods with 
typological theory “reduces the risks of mistaken inferences.”  Alexander George & Andrew Bennet, Case 
Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 254. 
52 Ackerman, “Beyond Arson?” 143–170; Earth Liberation Front Press Office, “What is the Earth 
Liberation Front?” http://www.elfpressoffice.org/theelf.html.; Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and 
Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front,” 351–368.; Leader and Probst, “The Earth 
Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 37–58.; Taylor, “Religion, Violence and Radical 
Environmentalism: From Earth First! to the Unabomber to the Earth Liberation Front,” 1–42. 
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effectiveness will infer that the differences are attributed to the variation in our 
independent variables, or the degree of state capacity and degree of centralization within 
the social movement organization.  Should we determine that potential exogenous 
variables are the source of variation then we will first look to determine if they truly are 
exogenous.  What first appear to be exogenous variables may be elements of our 
intervening variables, or frame resonance and connectivity to existing networks.   
Process-tracing is used in all cases to strengthen inferences from observations in 
the most similar case comparison.  Process tracing helps us determine if explanations 
from the most similar case comparison are causal or spurious.  Furthermore, it helps us 
confirm the causal chain, or how the “independent variable(s) lead to the outcome of the 
dependent variable”53 depicted in the theory, and highlights causal variables that are 
absent in the theory.  A combination of within-case comparison and process tracing helps 
us demonstrate the conditions under which leaderless social movement organizations may 
be more or less effective. 
                                                 
53 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan,” Comparative 
Politics 33, no. 1 (October, 2000): 183. 
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II. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–BROAD AND DEEP 
A. EARTH LIBERATION FRONT–UNITED STATES 
In this section we examine a cell within the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) to 
determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact that 
leadership has on ELF effectiveness in the U.S.  First we provide an overview of the ELF 
and the cell known as the Family and describe its direct action campaign in the U.S.  
Next we examine the political opportunities available to the ELF given the U.S. 
government’s capacity.  The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership 
on organizational effectiveness.  Through the lens of the political process model our 
analysis demonstrates that the ELF has a low degree of operational leadership and a low 
degree of effectiveness.   
1. Overview 
The ELF was founded in 1992, in Brighton, United Kingdom (UK) by activist 
members of the EarthFirst! organization.54  EarthFirst! was dedicated to saving the 
environment through protest, but over time, more radical members of the organization 
came to believe that direct action against government agencies and corporations would 
more effectively advance their agenda.55  In 1996, the North American ELF was 
established, and its first direct action was an arson attack on a U.S. Forest Service truck 
in Oregon.  As Leader and Probst point out, “the decoupling of (the) ELF from Earth 
First! enabled the two organizations to focus on their respective constituencies,” civilly 
disobedient protesters on the one hand, and violent activists on the other.56   
The ELF is an illegal but conspicuous organization.  Members primarily use 
arson, sabotage, and vandalism against the tools they claim that government agencies and 
corporations use to destroy the environment.  In 2004, the FBI declared the ELF and 
                                                 
54  Leader and Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” 38. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
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Animal Liberation Front (ALF) to be the top U.S. domestic terrorist threat57 based on its 
belief that between 1996 and 2002 the organizations were responsible for some 600 
criminal acts totaling $43 million in damages.58  While there is no way to know exactly 
how many incidents the ELF is responsible for, the yearly number of attacks claimed by 
the ELF continues to increase.  Attacks overseas, in particular, have increased markedly 
in recent years.  In total, the ELF has claimed responsibility for over 220 attacks around 
the world, while boasting that it has never harmed a life.59   
The ELF’s most notable attacks have occurred in the U.S.  In 1998, ELF activists 
burned several buildings at a ski resort in Vail, Colorado, causing over $24 million in 
damages.  In 2003, activists burned down a 206-unit condominium complex in San Diego 
that was nearing completion, causing $50 million in damages. In March 2008, the ELF 
claimed responsibility for setting fire to five mansions on “the street of dreams” in Echo 
Lake, Washington.60  It succeeded in completely destroying three of the homes, which, 
ironically, were eco-friendly.   
Between 1995 and 2001, the “destructive level of environmental terrorism (in the 
United States) soared.”61 During this period the Family engaged in twenty-one 
designated acts of terrorism,62 which was approximately one-third of all attacks 
committed in the name of the ELF in the U.S. during the same time period.  On January 
20, 2006, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the indictment of eleven Family 
                                                 
57  Horacio R. Trujillo, “The Radical Environmentalist Movement,” in Aptitude for Destruction. 
Volume 2: Case Studies of Organizational Learning in Five Terrorist Groups (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005), 141, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG332/. 
58  House Resources Committee, “The Threat of Eco-Terrorism,” 2002, 
http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress02/jarboe021202.htm. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Debera Carlton Harrell, Aubrey Cohen and Paul Shukovsky, “Street of Dreams’ Houses Torched; 
Eco-Terrorists Suspected,” SeattlePI,  accessed August 24, 2010, 
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/353498_arson04.html.  
61  Brent L. Smith, Jackson Cothren, Paxton Roberts, and Kelly R. Damphousse, “Geospatial Analysis 
of Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial and Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of 
International and Environmental Terrorists,” (National Criminal Justice Reference Service, May 2008), 
accessed August 24, 2010, http://www.ncjrs.gov/. 
62  Smith et al., “Geospatial Analysis of Terrorist Activities: The Identification of Spatial and 
Temporal Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of International and Environmental Terrorists,” 48. 
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members as a result of a FBI investigation known as “Operation Backfire.”63  Attorney 
General Alberto R. Gonzalez declared that “Today’s indictment proves that we will not 
tolerate any group that terrorizes the American people, no matter its intentions or 
objectives.”64   
According to the U.S. government, the Family conspired “to influence the 
conduct of government, business and private citizens by means of violence, sabotage, 
widespread destruction, and intimidation.”65  In all but one of its attacks the Family used 
sophisticated incendiary devices to commit arson, and it “took elaborate steps to avoid 
discovery.”66 Anywhere from one to eight Family members participated in each attack, 
but typical attacks consisted of three to five members.  The Family spent a relatively 
short time planning its direct actions, and most of the attacks were planned and 
committed within a relatively short distance from member homes.67   
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
Despite the high degree of breadth and depth of the U.S. government, political 
opportunities exist in the U.S. for environmental activists to engage in violent direct 
action against private corporations and government agencies.  As one of the most socially 
and technologically advanced countries in the world, the U.S. is hypothesized by many in 
the environmental movement to cause the greatest damage to the environment.68  A 
robust logging industry, plant and animal research facilities, sport utility vehicle (SUV) 
dealerships and vacation resorts are believed to harm the environment in one form or 
                                                 
63 FBI Operation Backfire website, accessed December 1, 2009; 
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/jan06/elf012006.htm. 
64 Ibid. 
65 U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum for CR 06–60069, CR 06–60070, CR 06–60071, CR 
06–60078, CR 06–60079, CR 06–60080, CR 06–60120, CR 06–60122, CR 06–60123, CR 06–60124, CR 
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66 Ibid. 
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Patterns of Preparatory Behavior of International and Environmental Terrorists,” 68. 




another and provide ample targets for the ELF.  However, these are not the only targets 
available to ELF activists in the U.S.  Electrical towers, apartment buildings, and even 
individual homes have been attacked as well.  
a.  Breadth 
The capacity of the U.S. government is best categorized as broad.  In 
2002, the U.S. had 941,139 total police officers or 327 police per 100,000 people.69  The 
police per capita figure of 327 is well above the median (288) for countries that reported 
this data to the World Bank in 2002.70  U.S. police maintain a persistent and visible 
presence throughout the entire population; however, the U.S. has some large areas that 
are sparsely populated.   
The U.S. had a density of 0.1 police per square kilometer in 2002.71  All of 
the Family’s attacks were conducted in the U.S. Pacific Northwest (Washington, Oregon, 
California, Wyoming, and Colorado) between 1995 and 2001, parts of which are in the 
least densely populated region in the contiguous U.S.  Despite the fact that police density 
in the U.S. is well below the median of 0.31, we categorize the U.S. as broad because the 
per capita figure is above the median and our experience living in various locations 
within the U.S. tells us that the police are never very far away.72  Furthermore, first 
responders quickly reacted to nearly all emergency calls related to the Family’s twenty 
attacks, even in sparsely populated areas. 
                                                 
69 NationMaster.com, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/cri_pol-crime-police#source; U.S. Census 
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html.  Per capita figures were derived from the police 
figures from NationMaster.com and 2000 census population (281,421,906), adjusted for annual growth of 3 
million per year.  The population of the U.S. was approximately 287,421,906 in 2002. 
70 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.” The median was generated from 
all countries that reported data to the World Bank in 2002.  
71 CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html.  
Police density was computed using U.S. land area from the CIA World Factbook and NationMaster.com 
police statistics.   
72 The police density median was computed from 48 countries that reported police statistics on 
NationMaster.com.  
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b.  Depth 
The capacity of the U.S. government is also categorized as deep.  The 
most recent law enforcement score for the U.S., assessed within the last five years, is 73, 
which is above the median of 60.73  Tax effectiveness indicates not only the degree to 
which the state may control the fiscal behavior of the population, but also behavior in 
general because so much of our lives depend on our fiscal capacity.  The U.S. score for 
tax effectiveness is 87.5, which is also the median.74 
Qualitative assessments also point to a high degree of depth for the U.S. 
government.  The U.S. government regularly demonstrates its capacity to regulate the 
population, promulgate new law, and enforce current law.  For example, U.S. law defined 
what was meant by “federal crime of terrorism” on November 1, 2000, and the 
modifications made to the law ultimately enhanced each of the Family members’ 
sentences.75   Additionally, multiple cases that occurred after September 11, 2001, 
provided precedence for future domestic terrorism prosecution and sentencing.  The 
flexibility of the U.S. legal system helped the U.S. government investigate and prosecute 
members of the Family between 2004 and 2006. 
Perhaps the two most significant impacts of U.S. capacity, in depth 
particularly, was the FBI’s ability to infiltrate the Family and effectively apply the law in 
order to prosecute members of the cell.  The results of these prosecution may have had a 
deterrent effect on ELF actions in the U.S.; attacks in the U.S. declined following the 
prosecution while attacks overseas increased.  Nevertheless, the ELF organizational 
structure was specifically designed to remain resilient in the most restrictive environment, 
and ELF attacks did not cease entirely.  A more detailed examination of the ELF’s 
mobilizing structures is necessary in order to determine the organization’s effectiveness 
and the conditions under which it may be effective in the broad and deep environment. 
                                                 
73 The World Bank, “Actionable Governance Indicators Data Portal.”  A total of 84 countries were 
assessed for law enforcement effectiveness by the World Bank between 2004 and 2009.  Most countries 
had only one assessment in those six years.  We computed the median from the latest assessment available 
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74 Ibid. 
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3. Leadership 
Leaders are responsible for mobilizing individuals to act collectively and in 
accordance with organizational guidelines.  The ELF, like all social movement 
organizations, mobilizes individuals through its structure, connectivity to local networks, 
and framing of its ideology; however unlike a majority of social movement organizations 
the ELF mobilizes individuals without a clear inspirational or operational leader.  
Mobilizing structures are a significant factor in the origin of social movements76, and 
according to Doug McAdam “structural stability, not disorder, facilitates movement 
emergence.”77  The ELF is an organization that is structurally stable despite the fact that 
it does not have a clearly identifiable leader.  In this section we first examine the ELF’s 
structure and connectivity to existing networks, and then we examine the degrees of 
inspirational and operational leadership. 
a. Organizational Structure 
The ELF organization is best characterized as having a decentralized 
cellular structure.  The ELF press office acts as a public relations center for cells, such as 
the Family, but spokespeople from the press office claim no ties to individual activists 
nor have they been linked by law enforcement authorities to direct actions in the past.  
The press office exists to hold press conferences and publish communiqués after attacks, 
and presumably to maintain the ELF website.  Following the attacks, communiqués 
claiming responsibility are sent to the ELF and/or ALF press office for public 
dissemination.   
The ELF has no membership list.  If one believes in the ELF’s ideology, 
and acts in accordance with ELF guidelines then he or she is an ELF member.78  It is up 
to the individual to determine whether or not he or she will become a member; 
individuals become members in their own minds.  ELF cells, however, exercise strict 
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control over who is admitted into the cell because cell leadership is most vulnerable to 
state repression.  The Family took extraordinary measures to conceal their identities, 
create alibis, and communicate from a distance with other cell members. 
The ELF’s organizational structure is dependent upon both direct and 
indirect ties.  Movement meetings, print publications, and the internet are mechanisms 
that are commonly used to link individuals to the ELF ideology and spur collective 
action.79  A benign environmentalist who desires to have a greater impact on saving the 
environment may come across the ELF website while searching the internet where he or 
she can find all the information needed to take direct action.  It is conceivable that the 
internet can provide the “salient” or strong tie that McAdam references as so important to 
individual involvement in a social movement;80 however, the internet, still in its infancy 
during the Family’s years does not appear to be pivotal to ELF recruitment.  Only one 
Family member became involved with the Family through an Internet tie.81  In the case 
of the Family, social relationships that developed through face-to-face meetings such as 
EarthFirst! rendezvous, Family “Book Club” meetings,82 and various protest events 
became the salient ties by which members became committed to direct action for the 
ELF.     
b.  Connectivity to Existing Networks 
The ELF’s organizational structure needs to be considered in the context 
of the larger environmental movement in which it exists.  The environmental movement 
has steadily gained traction throughout the world since the 1960s.  Hundreds of 
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organizations have sprung up in the U.S. alone.  Most organizations within the 
environmental movement are peaceful and were formed to raise public consciousness and 
lobby politicians.  Public consciousness of environmental issues has become more of a 
norm within the culture, and politicians increasingly pass environmentally friendly 
legislation to address the public’s environmental grievances.  Nevertheless, this growing 
network of organizations provides a large pool of possible recruits for the ELF, and 
forums to discuss direct action.   
c. Inspirational Leadership 
In his book Eco-Terrorism, Don Liddick describes the inspirational 
leaders in the environmental and animal rights movements.  He notes that: 
While there may be no official leaders in leaderless resistance movements, 
in the realm of animal rights and environmental radicalism there are 
nevertheless authors, public figures, and press officers who provide 
inspiration and ideological support; Ingrid Newkirk, Peter Singer, Steven 
Best, Edward Abbey, Paul Watson, Craig Rosebraugh, Leslie James 
Pickering, and Dave Foreman are just a few relevant examples.  
Movement icons are especially important and provide inspiration; Barry 
Horne, for example, engaged in several lengthy hunger strikes and died 
while incarcerated for animal liberation crimes, and Julia “Butterfly” Hill 
holds the record for the longest tree sit (about two years).83 
These inspirational leaders within the movement frame the ideology to appeal to 
movement sympathizers and reinforce activist commitment. They maintain the frames 
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Table 2.   The ELF Strategic Frames84 
Identity 
Frames 
As a nation and global community, we have witnessed the rapid decimation of our planet…for our 
families, our communities, for future generations, for all the species of life on the planet, and for 




From global warming, including the melting of the polar ice caps and polar bears threatened with 
extinction, to the air judged as unsafe to breathe in hundreds of U.S. cities, to the water supply polluted 
with chemicals and pharmaceuticals, to our food supply contaminated with genetic modification and 
genetically engineered ingredients, it is now common knowledge that environmental destruction is 
threatening life on earth. When it becomes clear that the U.S. government will not take the necessary 
measures to reverse this reality, and at the same time continues to allow corporations to get away with 





- To educate the public on the atrocities committed against the environment and all of the species that 
cohabitate in it 
- To inflict maximum economic damage to those who profit from the destruction of the natural 
environment - To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal - human or non-human 
Form your own Earth Liberation Front cell and do what needs to be done to protect life on the planet! 
If not you who? If not now when?  
Laws have to be broken to advocate for and to change the unjust and unhealthy practices. It is logical and 
a matter of international historic record. 
Maintenance 
Frames 
When politicians and governments refuse to prioritize the health of people, other species and the planet 
over the quest for financial gain, it is up to us to act. There is simply no excuse not to act. No longer may 
we allow the excuse of ignorance to prevent us from taking action. No longer may we rely on our own 
laziness, fear, insecurities, or inconveniences as an excuse not to act.  
Motivational 
Frames 
Every second we spend thinking of excuses as to why we don't take direct action, another glacier melts, 
another inch of the sea rises, another forest is clear-cut, another animal is skinned for a fur coat, another 
animal is tortured in a laboratory, another community is polluted, another factory churns out SUVs, another 
factory farm slaughters thousands of animals, another worker is exploited, another person becomes ill, and 
the planet is one step closer to no longer being able to sustain life. 
 
The narrative on the ELF’s website clearly indicates a high degree of 
internal resonance between frames (see Table 2).85  Leader and Probst describe the 
operating philosophy of the ELF as one in which the actions are the ends it pursues; goals 
are oriented toward actions, not political change.86  The ELF “depends on the 
commitment of individual members to a common ideology and set of goals.”87  In his 
analysis of the ELF, Paul Joosse writes that: 
Leaderless resistance allows the ELF to avoid ideological cleavages by 
eliminating all ideology extraneous to the very specific cause of halting 
the degradation of nature. In effect, the ELF’s use of leaderless resistance 
creates an ‘overlapping consensus’ among those with vastly different 
ideological orientations, mobilizing a mass of adherents that would have 
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never been able to find unanimity of purpose in an organization 
characterized by a traditional, hierarchical, authority structure.88 
The bridge between the broader environmental movement ideology and 
the ELF’s ideology is not too far; in fact the main difference is the prognostic 
frames.What are unique about the ELF’s strategic frames are its prognostic frames, or its 
goals and its methods for achieving those goals.  The ELF’s goals are to “educate,” 
“inflict economic damage,” and “avoid harming any life.”  These goals, digested in 
context of the broader environmental movement and compared to other environmental 
movement organizations seem relatively moderate.  Therefore recruiting members from 
the broader movement does not require a significant recruiting effort on the part of 
leadership.   
It is not apparent if the frames on the website have changed over the years, 
but their simplicity and resonance indicate they have likely not needed to be modified 
much, if at all.  Achievable, simple, and timeless goals resonate and require a low degree 
of maintenance over time.    The methods for achieving these goals, however, require a 
high level of commitment from ELF members.  EarthFirst! cofounder Dave Foreman 
justified criminal action in defense of the environment using the following metaphor:  
If you come home and find a bunch of Hell’s Angels raping your wife, 
your old mother, and eleven-year-old daughter, you don’t sit down and 
talk balance with them or suggest compromise.  You get your twelve 
gauge shotgun and blow them to hell…there are people out there trying to 
save their mother [Mother Earth] from rape.89 
According to Foreman and other environmental and animal rights authors, 
the government and corporations are the real terrorists.  Liddick’s research indicates that 
“movement literature (books, online journals, zines, etc.) frequently condemns its 
condemners as a rationale for engaging in direct action.”90  According to former ELF 
spokesman Craig Rosebraugh “the threat to the life of the planet is so severe that political 
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violence must be understood as a viable option.”91  Clearly the Family saw violence as a 
viable option.  Brent Smith and Kelly Damphousse have examined spatial and temporal 
patterns of the Family.  Their research indicates that “frequently these incidents involved 
local environmental activists who became ‘revolutionized’ after hearing speeches by 
nationally known radical environmentalists.  In the days and weeks following those 
speeches, local activists planned and committed attacks on local targets.”92        
Between 1997 and 2001, Craig Rosebraugh and Leslie James Pickering 
were spokespeople for the ELF.  Rosebraugh became a spokesperson after he was 
“contacted in 1997 by the ALF who was taking responsibility for a mink release thirty 
miles from Portland,” where he lived.93  Rosebraugh had previously sympathized with 
the ALF/ELF cause, and had published articles in “movement magazines and newspapers 
nationwide” declaring his support.94  For these reasons he became a trusted figure that 
activists could rely upon to “forward communiqués to the news media and the public.”95  
According to the U.S. Government Sentencing Memorandum in the Family case, 
Rosebraugh ended his tenure as ELF spokesperson in 2001 after he modified one of the 
Family’s communiqués without permission from its members.96  According to 
Rosebraugh, he had become disillusioned with attempts to effect change through what he 
called “single-issue pursuits” and he began to advocate for a more fundamental political 
and social change through revolution.97   
Liddick notes that “by 2002 Pickering’s rhetoric had become increasingly 
violent, framing ELF actions as part of a larger revolutionary struggle.”98  For Pickering 
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the ELF objectives were not to influence government policy but rather to “build a radical 
or even revolutionary resistance movement to the existing power structure.”99  Pickering 
notes that while he was spokesman “the ELF were clearly growing and building much 
public support.  This is because they were taking frequent spectacular actions and 
consistently evading capture.  They were very successful at gaining media attention and 
causing extensive economic damage to their chosen targets.”100  Pickering attributes the 
decline in growth since he left his office as spokesperson to the ELF’s change in 
strategy.101  The ELF was most successful when it caused multi-million dollar damage to 
large corporations or government buildings that were clearly separated from the public.  
Its decline ensued when it began to target SUV dealerships and apartment complexes.102  
According to Pickering, “the media and government worked to exploit this situation.”103   
In summary, inspiration for violent direct action comes from a collection 
of writings and speeches produced by multiple influential authors and speakers from 
above ground organizations within the anarchist, environmental and animal rights 
movement.  Books such as Dave Foreman’s Ecodefense:  A Field Guide to 
Monkeywrenching and Edward Abbey’s The Monkeywrench Gang provide both 
inspiration and operational tactics and techniques.    Within the cell known as the Family, 
cell leader William Rodgers provided an additional level of inspiration and operational 
direction to members of the cell.  EarthFirst! rendezvous and Book Club meetings 
provided forums for individuals to discuss the “tactics of property destruction.”104  
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d.  Operational Leadership 
There is little evidence to suggest that any individual above the cellular 
level has provided operational direction for the ELF.  Individuals in the Family cell acted 
alone or in smaller sub-cells of three to five individuals as advocated in the writings of 
movement authors.105  William Rodgers was the operational leader for the Family.  He 
coordinated and planned several of the Family’s attacks and participated in six arsons.  
According to the U.S. government “Rodgers was the principal proponent of and the 
leader at the Vail Ski Resort and the University of Washington Horticulture Center 
arsons.”106  He had written two “how to” manuals “on how to perform malicious 
destruction and arson.”  Rodgers was one of the individuals responsible for initiating the 
Book Club meetings, in which members “engaged in training classes to learn sabotage 
techniques, encryption software, and security measures to minimize infiltration by law 
enforcement.”107  Yet according to Smith and others, the Family was surprisingly 
spontaneous as “three-fourths of (antecedent) activities occurred within the three-day 
period immediately prior to, and including, the day of the incident.”108  The length of 
planning between “lone wolf” direct action and cellular organization structures such as 
the Family did not vary substantially.109  In their comparison with other environmental 
and international terror groups, Smith and others conclude that the Family was more 
spontaneous than other groups studied.110 
The only evidence that suggests there was coordination between cell 
members and a prominent organizational level figure involves the relationship of some 
Family members with Rodney Coronado.  Rodney Coronado was at one time the 
publisher of the EarthFirst! Journal, and he has been arrested multiple times for terror 
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acts committed in the names of the ALF and the ELF.  Family member Jonathan Paul 
lived with Coronado while Coronado was engaging in direct action for the ALF, and 
Chelsea Dawn Gerlach took part in the reconnaissance of potential genetic engineering 
targets at the University of Arizona under the guidance of Coronado.111  In January 2003, 
Coronado demonstrated how to build a firebomb out of household materials for a crowd 
of college students at American University in Washington, D.C.112  On February 22, 
2006, Coronado was arrested for demonstrating how to make an incendiary device during 
a speech in San Diego on the same day that a housing complex in nearby University City 
was torched by the ELF.113  Coronado claimed to be in Tucson the morning the fire was 
set.114   
Coronado is also a well known link between ALF and PETA.  PETA 
president Ingrid Newkirck reportedly gave Coronado “over $70,000 in ‘grants’ from 
(PETA’s) tax-exempt coffers” while the FBI was investigating him for several arsons he 
conducted under ALF “Operation Bite Back.”115  Liddick suggests “it may be fair to say 
that the border between PETA and ALF is amorphous.”116  Likewise, the ELF may be the 
underground organization of EarthFirst!, but it is not clear that EarthFirst! leaders provide 
operational direction to ELF cells.   
Despite that the FBI considers Coronado to be a national leader of the 
ELF,117 operational leadership appears to reside with the members themselves at the 
cellular level.  The number of ELF attacks in the U.S. steadily declined between 2006 and 
the end of 2008, or the time that Coronado was arrested and released from prison; 
however, this timeframe also corresponds to the indictment of the 11 Family members, 
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their trial, and sentencing.118  The extent to which each event impacted organization 
effectiveness remains unknown.  There is not enough open source information to declare 
Rodney Coronado as the national leader of the ELF, but based on his connections to some 
of the Family members we can say that he furthered some member’s operational 
knowledge to some degree.  Figure 4 shows that the degree of operational leadership 
within the ELF is low. 
 
Figure 4.   ELF Leadership Relationship 
4. Effectiveness 
Despite that the Family committed twenty-one attacks and inflicted $43 million in 
damages over a six-year period it was not very effective.  The Family was able to make 
contact with its adversaries in a broad and deep environment.  Members employed 
elaborate measures to conceal their preparation and activity from law enforcement.  They 
used codes and strict computer security procedures while communicating.  They built 
incendiary devices in sterile tents, wore gloves during attacks, and burned their clothes or 
soaked them in acid after attacks.  Through these measures they were able to conduct 
prolonged action against their target set.  These procedures were enforced by all Family 
members.   
The extent of the damages caused by the Family led the FBI to deem the ELF 
relevant in 2004 when it referred to the ALF and ELF as the top domestic terror threat.  
Of course, that relevancy acted as a double edged sword on the ELF as the FBI increased 
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its resources in the Pacific Northwest to investigate the cell.  Through their investigation 
U.S. authorities were able to coerce Family member Jacob Ferguson to turn against the 
 
Figure 5.   ELF Effectiveness 
other members.  The Family never progressed past relevancy, and was unable to gain 
concessions or convince its adversaries to change.  Many of the targets destroyed by the 
ELF were covered by insurance and quickly rebuilt or replaced.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
ELF’s effectiveness.    
However, when we revisit the stated goals of the organization it appears that the 
ELF has been quite effective.  The Family “educated,” “inflicted maximum economic 
damage,” and avoided harming any animal or human life.  Like we will see in the Salafi-
Jihad movement, the true goals of the violent activists within the environmental 
movement are loftier than those indicated in its frames.  ELF members who make the 
commitment to violent action also favor a rollback of civilization, which is so far-
reaching that it may appear unattainable to outsiders.  Many in the Family considered 
their actions effective because they were successful at making contact and gaining 
relevancy for a prolonged period; in essence the ELF’s goals had become about existence 
and action.119  ELF members understand they will probably not see results overnight or 
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even in their lifetime, and this is precisely why we will continue to see direct action from 
extremists within the environmental, animal rights, and anti-globalization movements for 
the foreseeable future. 
B. GAMAAT ISLAMIYAH–EGYPT 
In this section we examine Gamaat Islamiyah (GI) to determine the degree of 
operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on GI 
effectiveness in Egypt.  We will focus our study on the period when GI was most active, 
from 1992 to 1997 when violence between GI and the Egyptian government was at its 
peak.  First we provide an overview of GI by describing its origins and the direct actions 
it conducted during the aforementioned period.  Next, we examine the political 
opportunities available to the GI given the Egyptian government’s capacity.  The 
remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational 
effectiveness.  Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates 
that the GI has a low degree of operational leadership and a low degree of effectiveness.   
1. Overview 
Gamaat Islamiyah traces its roots back to the summer of 1973, just prior to the 
October war between Egypt, Syria, and Israel.  During that summer, student circles 
organized camps where Islamic militants indoctrinated students into “pure Islamic 
life.”120  These groups eventually evolved into student associations, which won a 
majority in the Egyptian Student’s Union in 1977.  Following the assassination of 
President Anwar Sadat on October 6, 1981, many of these militants were arrested and 
jailed.  While in jail, a dispute developed between the jailed leaders and two separate 
organizations were formed.  The first was named Tanzim Al-Jihad and was led by 
Lieutenant Abboud al-Zomor, one of the main conspirators in Sadat’s assassination, and 
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Ayman al-Zawahiri who is now recognized as a top al Qaeda leader.121  The second 
group reused the name Gamaat Islamiya and was responsible for much of the violence 
that erupted in Egypt in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Until 1992, the violence committed by GI members was mainly focused on the 
Coptic Christian minority.  The main goal during this time was to expand recruitment by 
turning the Coptics into scapegoats for economically depressed youth.  During the late 
1980s violence continued to escalate, culminating in the assassination of the former 
President of Parliament, Rifaat al-Mahgoub in 1990.122  Nineteen ninety two marked the 
beginning of GI’s most violent period with the assassination of Farag Foda on June 8.  
Foda was a secularist intellectual who was an outspoken opponent of sharia law and 
vocal proponent of normalizing relations with Israel.123  The summer of 1992 also 
marked the first time that tourists were targeted when a cruise boat on the Nile and a train 
were attacked.  In October 1992, an Englishwoman was killed, and several Germans were 
injured in December.124  In 1993, sporadic violence spread to Cairo, where several 
tourists were killed, culminating in the massacre at Luxor on November 17 1997, that 
resulted in the death of 60 people.125  
During this time GI also made a concerted attempt at controlling territory, 
occupying the district of Embaba in Cairo, and effectively replacing the government 
there.  GI organized all activities, from sporting events to schools and even changed the 
streets names in the district to Islamic names.  This process occurred over several years 
but became most successful after the release of militant leaders from jail in 1985.  GI 
control of Embaba lasted until December 1992 when the Egyptian government launched 
a massive offensive to retake the district after Sheik Gaber, GI’s self-proclaimed military 
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leader, declared to the international press that Emababa was an Islamic Republic.126  In 
all, there were approximately 1300 fatalities between 1990 and 1997 as a result of GI 
violence.127 
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
Despite the high degree of breadth and depth of the Egyptian government, there 
was still an opportunity for GI to gain control of small pockets of territory to establish a 
base of support.  In particular, the provinces of Asyut and Minia in Middle Egypt were 
particularly attractive to GI.  Islam had never fully established itself in these areas and 
there was a considerable Coptic Christian population, which the organization could blame 
for the economic troubles of the Muslims in that area.128 The lack of government 
influence in these areas appears to be more of a choice rather than a lack of capability 
given the large police force that it maintains.  In addition, the government has showed 
that it was capable of re-taking and maintaining control of territory at will.  
a. Breadth 
In terms of breadth, Egypt is categorized as broad.  In 1990, Egypt had 
122,000 national police and 300,000 paramilitary forces.129 With a population of 52.5 
million in the mid 1990, police per capita strength is 803 per 100,000 people, well above 
the median of 288 police per 100,000 people.130  When a lapse in government presence 
does occur such as in Embaba, the government is able to quickly respond and regain 
presence.  At Embaba, 14,000 troops occupied the district for six weeks, setting up police 
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stations and other government offices.131 In addition, Egypt had a density of 0.42 police 
per square kilometer in 1990.132  This statistic is above the median of 0.31 police per 
square kilometer as determined by the reported police strength of 48 countries.133 The 
fact that both police per capita as well as police per square kilometer are above average 
makes Egypt broad in capacity. 
b.  Depth 
Despite the fact that Egypt’s law enforcement score was 60, which is 
below the median of 73, the capacity of Egypt can also be categorized as deep.134 The 
Egyptian government during the 1980s and 1990s was a highly authoritarian regime 
capable of controlling many aspects of life through coercive and repressive tactics.  
Arrests of individuals for Islamist activities rose from 3,600 in 1992 to 17,000 in 1993, 
demonstrating the ability of the government to infiltrate into Egyptian society.135  The 
Egyptian government’s success at repressing Islamic radicals caused many, including 
Ayman al-Zawahiri, to abandon operations in Egypt in favor of working for the greater 
global jihad movement.136 In addition, Egypt had the ability to effectively control the 
fiscal behavior of the population with a tax effectiveness score 88 which is also the 
median.137 
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3.  Leadership  
The most prominent member of GI is Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman who serves as 
GI’s spiritual leader.  Born in Egypt in 1938, Abdel Rahman was jailed for being the 
religious advisor to Sadat’s assassins.  He was released in 1983 and briefly arrested again 
in 1989 after which he traveled to Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and finally the United States 
where he preached at the al-Salam mosque in Jersey City and the al-Badr mosque in 
Brooklyn.138 He was arrested in connection with the World Trade Center bombing that 
took place in February 1993 and is currently serving a life sentence in a Colorado prison.  
a.  Organizational Structure 
GI does not have a clear organizational structure.  Instead, the 
organization appears to be a collection of loosely affiliated cells.  The cells are comprised 
mostly of disenfranchised urban youth with a cadre of radical Islamic intellectuals who 
oversee recruiting and inspirational leadership.  Both the ELF and GI are similar in terms 
of organizational structure.  Both share a cellular structure, with the ELF press office 
being the equivalent of the Islamic intellectuals who “speak” for the organization.  In 
addition, ideology is spread in a similar fashion through face-to-face contact.  GI sought 
to gain a base of support by infiltrating into neighborhoods where anger over social and 
economic conditions could be directed against Coptic Christians as well as the Egyptian 
government.  Perhaps the biggest difference between the ELF and GI is the underlying 
ideology that each was trying to exploit.  ELF ideology appealed to those already 
concerned about the same issues, namely the destruction of the environment.  All that 
was needed was to inspire the individual to move from peaceful action to violence.  
Though religious, many of educated but poor Egyptians were upset at the government 
over economic and social issues, not spiritual ones.  GI leaders sought to frame an 
existing problem that was largely unrelated to their agenda in a context that was in line 
with GI’s ideology. 
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b.  Connectivity to Existing Networks 
GI had two main bases of support.  The first were the former members of 
the Gamaat Islamiyah student associations that were formed in the 1970s.  During that 
time, the number of students attending Egyptian universities doubled to half a million.139 
However, economic troubles such as the fall of the price of oil in 1985 left many of these 
former students unemployed and disenfranchised with the government making them 
prime candidates for recruitment.140  
The second base of support was the Muslim Brotherhood, which was 
mostly comprised of the professional middle class in Egypt.  Originally founded in 1928 
on the Suez Canal, the Muslim Brotherhood sought an Islamist Egyptian state, but 
differed from GI in that it favored change through the existing political process instead of 
violence.  The Muslim Brotherhood was successful in gaining representation in 
Parliament through the electoral process, and had also gained control of powerful private 
organizations such as trade unions.141  The Muslim Brotherhood operated a network of 
charitable activities throughout Egypt such as hospitals and schools, which GI used as 
bases for recruitment. 
The large student population in the 1970s combined with the popularity of 
the Muslim Brotherhood gave GI a relatively large pool from which to recruit.  However, 
connectivity to these groups was relatively weak compared to the connectivity to the 
hundreds of peaceful environmental groups that the ELF enjoyed.  The fact that the 
Muslim Brotherhood was gaining success through the existing political process made 
their supporters less likely to withdraw their support in favor of a more violent agenda.  
Due to a lack of operational leadership, GI was unable to compensate for this weak 
connectivity to existing networks.  
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c.  Inspirational Leadership 
Islamist sentiment in Egypt began to rise with Egypt’s defeat in the Six 
Day War in 1967 combined with the failure of the social and economic policies of 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, which promised economic prosperity, but instead left 
many youth disenfranchised and unemployed.  The anger over these events served as the 
base from which GI mobilized its members.  As the spiritual leader of GI, Sheik Omar 
Abdel Rahman not only blamed the Egyptian government, but also on the perceived 
economic success of the disproportionate number of Coptic Christians in the upper Nile 
region.  Christians in the region were well educated and occupied many prominent 
positions.142  This was framed as contrary to Islamic teachings, which required Christians 
to be humble and submissive and also required them to pay a tax in exchange for 
protection.  Instead, it should be Muslims who were prosperous, not Christians.  Omar 
Abdel Rahman frequently issued fatwas authorizing attacks against Coptic Christians.  
Thus, the solution to poverty and social inequality was to replace the Egyptian 
government with an Islamic state through a combination of violent jihad and preaching in 
“the compelling of good and the driving out of evil.”143 Unlike other Salafi-Jihad 
movement organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the inspiration of GI members 
was more rooted in the promise of material redemption than in spiritual redemption.  This 
framework resonated specifically amongst the poor; particularly those who attended 
college with the promise of financial success, but who found themselves back in their 
town unemployed and living off the charity of relatives.144  However, this framework had 
its limitations as evidenced by the case of Embaba, whose citizens had initially welcomed 
GI under the promise of improved living conditions, but who ended up turning against 
them as the imposition of Islamic law degraded into purely criminal activity.145  Table 3 
summarizes the various strategic frames used by Sheik Gaber and GI in order to gain 
support. 
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Table 3.   GI Strategic Frames 
Identity 
Frames 
Egyptian Muslims are living under the rule of an immoral government, which has promised prosperity but 




-The Egyptian government is responsible for the financial and moral decline of the state. 
-Coptic Christians have unfairly gained success at the expense of Muslims.  Holy texts call on Muslims to 





-Replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state.  
-Establish control of small pockets of territory and establish Islamic law. 
-De-legitimize the Egyptian government through attacks on secular leaders and tourists. 
Maintenance 
Frames 
Economic and social prosperity will only come with the establishment of and Islamic state. 
Motivational 
Frames 
If the Egyptian government is allowed to continue, then Egypt will continue to fall into moral decay and 
come under the influence of Zionism (Israel). 
 
In contrast to the ELF, the gap between social and economic woes and 
violent jihad was a broad one.  As noted earlier, the main difference between the ELF and 
peaceful environmental movements was the prognostic frame, which included violence.  
For GI, the leadership needed to work much harder to bridge a much wider gap between 
frames.  Just about the only aspect shared between GI and its target audience was the 
identity and part of the diagnostic frame that identified the Egyptian government as the 
problem.  This disparity is evident in the fact that many of those that eventually joined GI 
were the university students in the 1970s that had gone to school with the encouragement 
of the secular Egyptian government.  Had employment and economic prosperity 
followed, the legitimacy of the government would have been validated, thus eliminating 
 
the remaining common frames.  This meant that recruiting required a significant effort on 
the part of leadership, and new frames had to be added, such as the perceived success of 
the Coptic Christians.   
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d.  Operational Leadership 
Very little is known about the operational leadership of GI with the 
exception of an electrician named Sheik Gaber Mohammed Ali who emerged from the 
seiged district of Embaba, claiming to be the military leader of GI.  It is questionable that 
Sheik Gaber was actually the leader of GI, but there is no doubt that he ran Embaba, 
organizing vigilante squads and acting as judge and jury within the community.147 
Whether or not Gaber was actually the military leader of GI, there is a clear distinction 
between inspirational and operational leadership (Figure 6).  Omar Abdel Rahman was 
arrested in June 1993 in the United States, yet attacks still continued in Egypt, including 
the massacre at Luxor in 1997. 
The operational structure of GI is similar to that of the ELF in that there is 
little evidence to suggest that there is an individual who provides operational direction, 
planning, or coordination to achieve tactical and strategic objectives.  Actions are planned 
and executed at the individual or cellular level.  With the exception of Gaber in the case 
of Embaba, no other individual has been identified that has provided operational 
direction.  
 
Figure 6.   GI Leadership Relationship  
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On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, GI was not very successful, achieving a 
score of 2 (target acknowledgement of social movement organization as valid and 
relevant, see Figure 7).  Internally, the inability to keep the actions of the disenfranchised 
urban youth from degrading into purely criminal activity significantly hindered 
effectiveness.  Externally, many of the violent acts alienated the Egyptian population, 
causing even sympathizers such as the Muslim Brotherhood to distance themselves from 
GI.  In addition, a massively brutal and repressive response by the Egyptian government 
was too much for GI to overcome.  
 
Figure 7.   GI Effectiveness 
The district of Embaba serves as an example of GI’s inability to maintain the 
religious and political focus of its recruits.  Christian businesses were routinely looted 
and the people beaten.  Many youth who were not more than common criminals used 
religious radicalization as a way of conducting criminal activities unabated.  The result 
was that those that once sympathized with GI turned against them.148 GI attacks on 
tourists had an even greater effect on alienating the Egyptian population.  The massacre 
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at Luxor resulted in a steep decline in tourism, which alienated those that depended on 
the tourist trade such as restaurant owners and market vendors regardless of their 
religious beliefs.149  
The brutal and repressive response by the Egyptian government also prevented GI 
from being very effective.  The government responded to the occupation of Embaba by 
deploying 14,000 troops, occupying the neighborhood for six weeks and arresting 
hundreds of people.150 After Embaba, GI was unable to effectively mobilize the urban 
youth, as the Egyptian government embarked on a campaign of repression culminating in 
a call for a ceasefire by GI’s imprisoned leadership in July 1997.151 
While the repressive capacity of the Egyptian state certainly contributed to the 
failure of GI, the lack of operational leadership combined with a lack of internal and 
external resonance in its frames were also significant factors contributing to GI’s lack of 
success.  Had GI been left to operate without government response, it would have still 
alienated the Egyptian population as evidenced by Embaba and the fallout from the 
attacks on tourists.  While individual operations were aimed at achieving certain 
economic or social effects, the lack of operational leadership meant each event was not 
linked to the next in a greater strategic framework that severely inhibited effectiveness. 
While both the ELF and GI were never able to progress past relevancy, the ELF is 
more successful when it comes to persistency.  The goals of the ELF are much more 
broad and global when compared to the goals of GI, which were confined to the state of 
Egypt.  ELF activists realize that they may not see results in their lifetime.  In contrast, 
the more localized goals of GI made it easier to see the “writing on the wall” when the 
movement had failed.   For GI, successes and failures were more quantifiable in the form 
of territory, membership, and public support than for ELF.  Thus, GI leaders were able to 
determine when they had been defeated.  For the ELF, whose goals are continued 
existence and action, the end will never be clear. 
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III. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–BROAD AND SHALLOW 
A. LASHKAR-I-TAIBA–INDIA 
In this section we examine Lashkar-I-Taiba (LeT) to determine the degree of 
operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on LeT 
effectiveness in India.  While LeT was originally founded with the intent to drive India 
out of the region of Kashmir, it expanded operations into India beginning in the mid-
1990s.  We focus our study on this period when LeT operated in India, from 1994 to the 
present.  First we provide an overview of LeT by describing its origins and the direct 
actions it conducted during the aforementioned period.  Next we examine the political 
opportunities available to LeT given the Indian government’s capacity.   The remainder 
of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness.  
Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates that the LeT 
has a moderate degree of operational leadership and a low degree of effectiveness.   
1. Overview 
LeT is a radical Islamic group operating in both India and Pakistan. The 
organization’s main goal is to free Kashmir from Indian control in order to establish an 
Islamic state.152  It has been debated whether or not LeT has expanded this goal to 
encompass all of India or to establish two independent Islamic states in northern and 
southern India.153  The organization established its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan just 
outside the city of Lahore, capital of the Pakistani province of Punjab. 
LeT is the military wing of Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad (MDI), an organization 
founded in 1987 to assist the Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation.154  Both 
Pakistan’s intelligence service, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), as well as the U.S. 
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked with MDI until the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in the late 1980s.  LeT was founded in 1990 and initially operated in eastern 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union until it shifted focus to Kashmir under the direction 
of the ISI.155  It is believed that Pakistan continued to exert some control over LeT until 
Pakistani President Musharraf banned the organization in 2002.  In October 2001, the 
U.S. officially designated LeT a terrorist organization.  
In 1994, LeT began to carry out attacks in Kashmir and has since expanded 
operations into the rest of India.  Its first attack took place in October 1994 when 50–60 
members ambushed an Indian Army convoy, eventually executing five soldiers.156  Since 
then, LeT members have carried out numerous attacks in India including the massacres of 
Hindus in January 1996, January 1997, June 1997, April 1998, and August 1998.157  
Other significant attacks include a raid on the Indian parliament in December 2001 and 
an attack on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak, which killed 36.158 LeT also carried out a 
series of bombings in Mumbai on July 11, 2006, which killed approximately 200 people 
as well as a second series of shooting and bombing attacks in Mumbai in November 
2008. 
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
Despite being a modern, well-established democracy, India still suffers political 
problems, which opens up opportunities to radical groups such as LeT.  The Indian law 
enforcement system has at times practiced selective justice, which has increased 
sympathy for radical Muslim groups in India.  For example, India has pressed Pakistan 
relentlessly to extradite Dawood Ibrahim for his role in the Mumbai attacks in 1993.  Yet 
Indian authorities have made little attempt to bring to justice those that instigated riots in 
the Indian state of Gujarat in 2002 in which scores of Muslims were killed.159  The 
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relatively free level of speech afforded by the democratic government has also allowed 
Hindu nationalists to increasingly advocate an anti-Muslim agenda, making radical 
groups more attractive to Muslims living in India as a means of self-defense.160 
a.  Breadth 
The capacity of the Indian government is best categorized as broad.  In 
2001, there were approximately 2 million police in India.161  In addition, a paramilitary 
force of approximately 1.3 million supplements state police forces.162  Given a 
population of roughly 1.1 billion, there are 300 police per 100,000 people, which is above 
the median of 288 per 100,000 as reported by the World Bank.163  With a land area of 
2,973,193 square kilometers, there are 1.1 police per square kilometer, three times the 
median as reported by the World Bank.164 
b.  Depth 
In terms of depth, India is categorized as shallow.  The most recent law 
enforcement score for India assessed within the last five years is 58, which is slightly 
below the median of 60.165  India has the maximum tax effectiveness score of 100, with 
the median score being 87.5.166 Quantitatively, these figures indicate a capacity that is 
more deep than shallow. However, qualitative data indicates that state capacity is shallow 
due to several financial and political challenges. 
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In fiscal years 2007–2008, India had what was considered a massive 
budget deficit, which amounted to six percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
This deficit was attributed to inefficient government policies such as unproductive 
subsidies and tax incentives in addition to numerous tax loopholes.167  Corruption is 
widespread in public offices, which are frequently misused.  Administrators have 
relatively wide discretion in implementing government policies with little transparency or 
fear of prosecution.168 Thus, while the Indian government may have the capability to 
exercise greater depth of control, in reality control is implemented shallowly. 
3.  Leadership 
Hafiz Saeed, a professor of Islamic studies at a Pakistan university, is the founder 
of MDI and the leader of LeT.  In the 1980s, Saeed traveled to Afghanistan to join the 
mujahidin in the struggle against the Soviet Union where he met Osama bin Laden and 
was inspired by the jihadi movement. Upon his return to Pakistan, Saeed founded MDI 
on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan.  Saeed believed that the problem facing Muslims 
was their enslavement by the West.  Thus, jihad was a means of “establishing the rule of 
Islam.”169  After LeT was banned in Pakistan in 2002, LeT’s main base of operations was 
transferred from Pakistan to Kashmir, and Saeed stepped down as leader.170  In his place, 
an obscure figure named Abdul Wahid took over as leader.  Since he took over, Wahid 
has never been seen in public or issued any statements.171 
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a.  Organizational Structure 
LeT follows a hierarchical military style structure with a chief 
commander, provisional commander, district commander, and battalion commander (see 
Figure 8).  The organization is divided into districts and operates training camps 
throughout Pakistan and Kashmir.  LeT also has a separate policymaking body headed by 
an amir and a naib amir (deputy), which also has a hierarchical structure and is 
responsible for the formulation of strategy.172  
 
Figure 8.   LeT Organizational Structure 
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b.  Connectivity to Existing Networks 
Until 2002, LeT enjoyed the support of Pakistan, in particular, the ISI, 
which saw LeT as a useful tool to wage a proxy war with India.173  The ISI was allegedly 
the primary supporter of LeT both for finance and training.174  LeT was permitted to 
operate unhindered from its headquarters in Muridke, Pakistan, and militants have been 
trained in ISI-run camps in Afghanistan.  In addition, it was reported that Lieutenant 
General Mahmood Ahmed, who was the Director General of the ISI at the time, attended 
a LeT meeting in April 2001.  The outcome of the meeting was a resolution that called 
upon India-based operatives to destroy Hindu temples and place the flag of Islam on top 
of the ruins.175  As a result of pressure from the western nations, Pakistan has in recent 
years withdrawn support for LeT. 
LeT has maintained a relationship with several radical Islamist groups 
including Al Qaeda.  Osama bin Laden reportedly contributed ten million Pakistani 
rupees towards the construction of a mosque at the headquarters of MDI including a 
guesthouse where he personally stayed while visiting.  It has also been alleged that bin 
Laden attended annual MDI meetings.176  In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a top Al Qaeda 
leader, was captured at a LeT safe house in Faisalabad, Pakistan. In addition, LeT has 
dispatched operatives to conflict areas around the world such as Bosnia, Chechnya, and 
Iraq in an attempt to forge ties with other extremist groups.177  
LeT has also forged ties with radical groups within India such as the 
Student Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which assisted in carrying out various attacks 
such as the bombings in Mumbai in July 2006.178  Several SIMI members have been 
arrested for assisting in LeT operations.  Majid Mohammed Shafi was accused of 
smuggling explosives and Pakistani militants across the Indian border into Bangladesh.  
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Sajid Margun Ansari, who ran a mobile phone repair shop, was arrested for providing 
electronic timer circuitry.179  Such arrests demonstrate that LeT has managed to co-opt 
native Indians to help in their cause. 
c.  Inspirational Leadership 
Kashmiri nationalists who sought independence from India in order to 
establish a secular, democratic state originally carried out the struggle for the 
independence of Kashmir.  However, since the early 1990s, an increasing number of 
Islamist groups, such as LeT, have intervened in the conflict.  For these groups, the 
struggle for Kashmir is framed as not just a war between Kashmiri Muslims and India, 
but also a global struggle between Muslims and Hindus, who are in league with other 
“enemies of Islam,” namely Jews and Christians.180  Many members are self-motivated 
to join the organization.  Militants join as either a means to gain social status or due to 
anger over perceived injustices committed by the Indian government.  Pakistanis in 
particular are exposed to propaganda at an early age on the Indian occupation of 
Kashmir.  Indian soldiers are shown beating Kashmiris on television where stories of 
numerous brutalities are circulated.181  The struggle against India appears to resonate 
with only a small segment of the Pakistani population.  Studies have shown that most 
LeT recruits belong to the lower middle class and come from villages in the Punjab 
region182.  Many come from families that were traumatized by the violent partition of 
India and Pakistan and seek to defend the honor of their families.183  In addition, many 
members come from lower castes that are seeking to gain prestige for their families by 
fighting.184  This sense of individual and family empowerment is the main motivation for 
many LeT militants.  There are also financial incentives for socially frustrated and poor 
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young men, as LeT militants receive a monthly salary and the prestige of military 
glory.185  Once accepted into training, militants receive intensive military and religious 
training aimed at altering their identities - they grow their hair long and stop shaving.  In 
addition, they adopt Islamic pseudonyms in place of their real names.186  Once members 
are recruited and trained, LeT relies more upon military skill than ideology to motivate its 
members.  Attacks are carefully planned and carried out with extreme precision.  This is 
evident in the fact that LeT members have never carried out a suicide bombing.187  In 
addition, the preferred method of attack, which is the fedayeen attack (small groups of 
three to five men), always carries a small chance of survival for the militants.188 Table 4 
summarizes the various strategic frames used by LeT leadership. 
Table 4.   LeT Strategic Frames 
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Identity 
Frames 
As Muslims, we must fight to free Kashmir from the control of India, which has conspired with other 




-India has engaged in brutal and repressive tactics to control Kashmir. 





- Drive India out of Kashmir through military confrontation. 
- “The jihad in Kashmir would soon spread to entire India. Our Mujahideen would create three Pakistans in 
India.” 
- “We feel that Kashmir should be liberated at the earliest. Thereafter, Indian Muslims should be aroused to 




If India is not confronted, then it will eventually destroy Pakistan and then other Muslim nations will fall. 
Motivational 
Frames 
Those that fight and die for the liberation of Kashmir will earn honor and prestige for themselves and their 
families.   
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d.  Operational Leadership 
Operational leadership appears to be relatively decentralized.  However, 
Hafiz Saeed has provided some measure of operational direction.  He reportedly decided 
how many militants to send into Kashmir based upon the number of deaths that occurred 
and the capacity of the organization inside Kashmir to absorb new fighters.190  In 
addition, Saeed made several statements in 1996 and 1997, which outlined the 
operational goals of the organization: 
The jihad in Kashmir would soon spread to entire India. Our Mujahideen 
would create three Pakistans in India.  We feel that Kashmir should be 
liberated at the earliest. Thereafter, Indian Muslims should be aroused to 
rise in revolt against the Indian Union so that India  gets disintegrated.191 
Despite the fact that Saeed provided some operational leadership, LeT’s 
day-to-day operations were more decentralized.  In a December 28, 2000, interview with 
a Los Angeles Times reporter, a LeT militant named Abu Samara claimed that he 
operated out of a self-sustaining MDI base in Pakistan that provided spiritual and military 
training.192 Figure 9 illustrates the moderately decentralized structure of LeT. The slight 
overlap between inspirational and operational leadership can be attributed to the fact that 
LeT was based outside of India and could operate relatively freely in both Pakistan and 
Pakistan held Kashmir.193 However, operations inside India required a more 
decentralized operational structure due to the extremely broad capacity of the Indian 
government. Avoiding detection required a significant effort on the part of LeT militants, 
who used fake travel documents and untraceable phones to avoid being caught.194 
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Figure 9.   LeT Leadership Relationship 
4. Effectiveness 
On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, LeT was not very successful, achieving a 
score of 2 (target acknowledgement of social movement organization as valid and 
relevant, see Figure 10).  While LeT has managed to carry out numerous deadly attacks 
inside India, the Indian government does not appear to be persuaded in any way to make 
concessions with regard to Kashmir, either through troop reduction or troop 
withdrawal.195  Attempts at escalating tensions between India and Pakistan have also 
failed, causing a split between members who align themselves with the Pakistani 
government and members who feel that efforts to liberate Kashmir from India should 
intensify.  Most notably, a top LeT leader, Maulana Zafar Iqbal, has gone on to form his 
own militant group called Khairun Naas (People’s Welfare).196  Despite several daring 
and highly publicized attacks inside India, LeT has so far failed to garner widespread 
support from Indian Muslims.  
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Figure 10.   LeT Effectiveness 
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B. ANIMAL LIBERATION FRONT–MEXICO 
In this section we examine the Frente de Liberación Animal (FLA), or Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF) in Mexico, to determine the degree of operational leadership 
within the organization and the impact leadership has on ALF effectiveness.  First we 
provide an overview of the ALF and describe the direct actions conducted by the ALF in 
Mexico.  Next we examine the political opportunities available to the ALF given the 
Mexican government’s capacity.  The remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of 
leadership on ALF’s effectiveness.  Through the lens of the political process model our 
analysis demonstrates that the ALF has very little, if any, operational leadership in 
Mexico and a very low degree of effectiveness.   
1. Overview 
The ALF was founded in 1976 in Great Britain by Ronnie Lee and approximately 
thirty other individuals.197  According to Liddick, Lee had long been involved in animal 
rights activism in Great Britain, and he “learned to mimic the Irish Republican Army 
(IRA), adopting the organizational structure of decentralized, small, autonomous 
cells.”198  The ALF matured in Great Britain over the next ten years, effectively 
damaging British businesses and research facilities through its direct actions.  In 1989, 
after 14 attempted bombings by animal rights activists, “Scotland Yard [classified the] 
ALF as a terrorist organization in the same category as the IRA and Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO).”199   
The North American ALF is very similar to the original organization formed in 
Great Britain and to the ELF discussed in the previous chapter.  The ALF’s website has a 
wealth of information including its philosophy and tactics, links to similar organizations 
in the animal rights movement, and graphic videos of animal abuse.  The ALF’s mission 
statement is “to effectively allocate resources (time and money) to end the ‘property’ 
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status of nonhuman animals.”200  Its objective is “to abolish institutionalized animal 
exploitation because it assumes that animals are property.”201  The ALF particularly 
opposes vivisection or surgical experimentation on live animals.  The mission of the ALF 
is not confined to any particular region but instead can be applied by peoples in all areas 
of the globe where animals are being “exploited;” in fact attacks have been conducted in 
the name of the ALF around the world.        
Recently, the ALF has claimed responsibility for a rash of attacks in Mexico.   
According to the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), the ALF has 
committed over 120 direct actions in Mexico between the beginning of 2008 and the end 
of 2009, but a Strategic Forecasting Incorporated (STRATFOR) report issued in 
September 2009 indicates the number may be even higher.202  Scott Stewart of 
STRATFOR notes that there were approximately 200 direct action attacks in Mexico 
between January and September of 2009 alone.  Approximately 157 of those attacks were 
arson or incendiary devices, which by way of comparison is more arson attacks than were 
conducted by American environmental and animal rights organizations in the U.S. since 
2001.203   
The ALF’s direct action in Mexico has consisted of vandalism, arson, and even 
bombings via improvised explosive devices (IED).204  The use of IEDs among 
environmental and animal rights organizations is unique.  IEDs may create unwanted 
collateral damage.  After all one of the objectives of the ALF, like the ELF is to “take all 
necessary precautions against hurting any animal, human or non-human.”205  September 
2009 targets included Banamex bank branches, Telmex phone booths, vehicles, offices, 
and cables, and Novartis, a customer of Huntingdon Life Sciences that conducts 
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experimentation on animals.206  Novartis has also been accused by activists as having 
spread “genetically modified seed throughout Mexico’s corn-growing belt … 
contaminating native species of maize.”207  Other targets in recent years have included 
fast food “restaurants (including McDonald’s and Kentucky Fried Chicken), meat shops, 
pet shops, fur and leather stores, luxury vehicles, and construction equipment.”208 Most 
attacks have been conducted by cells in the populous areas in and around Mexico City 
and Guadalajara.209   
A variety of organizations, groups, and/or cells have claimed responsibility for 
attacks in Mexico.  The Subversive Alliance for the Liberation of the Earth, Animals and 
Humans (ASLTAH) claimed responsibility for several September 2009 IED attacks.210  
FLA Mexico (FLAM) and FLA-Commando Verde Negro (CVN) have also claimed 
responsibility for attacks in Mexico through communiqués in which they greet their 
“brothers” in the ALF and ELF.    These groups all operate in accordance with ALF 
guidelines and are likely cells within the ALF in Mexico.  Perhaps cell identification and 
use of IEDs are indications that the ALF has very little operational leadership in Mexico, 
but before we discuss leadership we examine the opportunities available in Mexico. 
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
As we shall see in this section, political opportunities for animal rights activists to 
engage in violent direct action are plentiful in Mexico.  Over the past four years the 
Mexican government has been preoccupied with its war on drugs.211  The government’s 
focus on the drug trade and trafficking has expanded the opportunity for anarchist, 
environmental, and animal rights activists to increase their direct action activities in 
Mexico, but there have been no significant arrests or prosecutions of animal rights 
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activists in Mexico despite the significant number of attacks.  Limited information 
available on the ALF in Mexico speaks to the government’s lack of capacity to control 
the population.   
a.  Breadth 
Mexico’s capacity is best categorized as broad.  In 2002, Mexico had 
495,821 total police officers or 492 police per 100,000 people.212  The police per capita 
figure of 492 is well above the median (288) for countries that reported this data to the 
World Bank in 2002.213  Mexican police maintain a persistent and visible presence 
throughout the entire population; however, Mexico, like the U.S., has some large areas 
that are sparsely populated.   
Mexico had a density of 0.25 police per square kilometer in 2002.214  
Most of ALF’s attacks have occurred in urban centers within Mexico.  Despite the fact 
that police density in Mexico is slightly below the median of 0.31,215 we categorized 
Mexico as broad because the military has increased its presence and bolstered local 
police forces to intensify its prosecution of the drug war.216   
b.  Depth 
Mexico is also categorized as shallow.  The most recent law enforcement 
score for Mexico, assessed within the last five years, is 56.25, which is below the median 
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of 60.217  Mexico’s score for tax effectiveness is 62.5, which is below the median of 
88.218 Qualitative assessments also point to a low degree of depth for the Mexican 
government.  The Mexican government regularly demonstrates its inability to regulate the 
population and enforce current law.  Local law enforcement is corrupt.  Over the past two 
years President Felipe Calderon’s government has attempted to “purge [the] ranks” of 
local police forces and remove corrupt officers, but it appears to be an ongoing process 
that may take even more time.219  A more detailed examination of the ALF’s mobilizing 
structures is necessary in order to determine the effectiveness of the ALF and the 
conditions under which it may be effective in the broad and shallow environment. 
3.  Leadership 
Like all social movement organizations, the ALF mobilizes individuals through 
its structure, connectivity to existing networks, and framing of its ideology.  The ALF’s 
organizational structure and strategic frames are very similar to those of the ELF, but 
there are subtle differences that may explain differences in effectiveness between the two 
organizations.  The ALF’s connectivity to existing networks in Mexico is superior to that 
of the ELF in the U.S.   
a. Organizational Structure 
The ALF’s organizational structure is markedly different from that of LeT.  
Though both organizations use illegal methods to pursue their objectives they sit at 
different ends of the structural spectrum.  While LeT is hierarchical with a military style 
structure, the ALF is decentralized and cellular.  According to the ALF’s website 
“activists work anonymously, either in small groups or individually, and do not have a 
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centralized organization or coordination.”220  The ALF makes it clear that it has elected 
to operate within a decentralized structure because “ALF actions may be against the 
law.”221  The North American Animal Liberation Press Office (NAALPO) explains that 
“cells are non-hierarchical in their structure, which allows for only those people involved 
directly in the action to control their own destiny.”222  Like the ELF, the ALF has no 
membership list.  “Any group of people who are vegetarians or vegans and who carry out 
actions according to ALF guidelines have the right to regard themselves as part of the 
ALF.”223  There is no reason to believe that the ALF in Mexico operates under a different 
organizational structure than the one described by the NAALPO.   
b.  Connectivity to Existing Networks 
The ALF has a high degree of connectivity to other environmental and 
animal rights organizations.  Although it has not grown to the same extent as the 
environmental movement in terms of numbers of organizations, the animal rights 
movement has made significant strides raising public consciousness of animal rights 
issues and “moved further into the mainstream.”224  For example, a 2008 ballot measure 
in California aimed at improving the treatment of egg-laying chickens passed 
overwhelmingly with 63% of the vote.225  Also in 2008, Spain’s parliament “passed a 
resolution calling for legal rights to be extended to nonhuman primates.”226  Legal, above 
ground organizations, such as the Humane Society and PETA, have been working for the 
past four decades to change the public consciousness with regard to animal rights, and 
from the increase in animal rights legislation they have been somewhat successful.   
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According to the FBI “significant overlap in personnel and support 
networks exist among ALF and related groups.”227  PETA has been particularly 
supportive of the ALF in the U.S.  PETA’s director Ingrid Newkirk provided operational 
and financial support to ALF activist Rodney Coronado, who was convicted “for the 
1992 arson of a Michigan State University research laboratory.”228  In Mexico, however, 
the ALF may be more connected to organizations outside the animal rights movement.  A 
strong anarchist movement in Mexico underpins environmental and animal rights 
activism.  Violence appears to breed violence as activists from all three movements incite 
each other to step up their direct action.  The ALF, ELF, and anarchists in Mexico have 
all attacked similar targets with similar tactics and at similar times.229  A majority of the 
prosecutions of ALF attacks have been students, or young people, who have expressed 
anarchist views, views that are common among members of ALF and ELF wherever they 
act.230  It is likely that the same individuals act under the mantle of all three movements 
in Mexico.  With respect to connectivity, the ALF in Mexico appears to be very similar to 
LeT in India; both organizations have a high degree of connectivity to diverse 
movements. 
c.  Inspirational Leadership 
There are no clearly identifiable inspirational leaders of the ALF in 
Mexico.  The inspiration that appears to fuel ALF members in North America comes 
from historical and current literature, North American press officers, and activism itself.  
In 1975, Peter Singer wrote Animal Liberation, which “laid out the philosophical 
groundwork for regarding animals as deserving of greater respect and legal 
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protection.”231  “Singer wrote that the benefits of eating animals and using them in 
biomedical research are minimal compared with the suffering of animals.”232  Animal 
Liberation is referred to as the bible of the animal rights movement, and many 
contemporary inspirational leaders utilize Singers fundamental concepts in framing the 
ideology to cultural norms. 233    
North American ALF press officers provide a degree of inspirational 
leadership for the organization.  Rick Bogle, Jason Miller, Nicoal Sheen, Jerry Vlasak, 
and Gary Yourofsky are all highly educated individuals that serve as official press 
officers, but none are from Mexico nor do they have overt links to Mexican activists.  
Advisors and speakers (and self-proclaimed activists) include Peter Young, Erin Skinner, 
and Steven Best.  Best, an associate professor of philosophy and humanities at the 
University of Texas, El Paso, is perhaps one of the most influential writers and 
spokespeople for animal rights in North America.  He has written numerous books on 
environmental and animal liberation radicalism.234    
Incarcerated activists, past and present, also provide a degree of 
inspiration for members.  Barry Horne was an imprisoned animal rights activist in Great 
Britain, who staged a series of hunger strikes between 1997 and 1998.235  His hunger 
strikes gained international attention from movement sympathizers around the world, and 
he died in prison in 2001 of liver failure.236  Consider the following excerpt from a 
communiqué disseminated after an animal liberation operation in Mexico on November 
5, 2009:  
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Once again, united in a cell of the Frente de Liberación Animal – 
Comando Verde Negro (FLA – CVN), we have taken to the streets to 
realize the dream of so many lukewarm veg(etari)ans who chant, shout, 
sing and whine for Animal Liberation at concerts, in front of a computer, 
looking at photographs of tortured and dying animals, at peaceful 
demonstrations, among other events and places far removed from the 
breeders, laboratories, the dog pounds, the 'pet' stores, the farms, etc. 
where the animals are truly hoping that you will shake your fear, your 
defeatist attitude and that you will decide once and for all to begin to 
realize your dream, your yearning, your desire for Animal Liberation… 
Tonight, the 5th of November, a day to commemorate and remember, not 
the death but the life of a person of great worth in the fight against 
anthropocentrism (sic)-- Barry Horne-- we decided to strike against 
speciesism once again…This action is also dedicated to the person who 
was arrested in Guadalajara last month; other cells have also expressed 
solidarity with Ramses Villareal, arrested on charges of terrorism but who 
kept silent and was released. Now we, the FLA - CVN make this 
dedication, hoping that this comrade has been well and has strength to 
move forward after his arrest.237 
Jerry Vlasak, spokesman for the North American ALF, said his organization 
receives anonymous news statements from the Mexican group but does not know 
who its members are because they operate secretly.”238     
Anonymous authors in magazines such as Bite Back, Arkangel, and No 
Compromise extend the philosophical arguments made by Singer and expand on the 
frames outlined in Table 5. 239    Rabia y Acción, or Anger and Action magazine, is one 
such publication produced in Mexico and written in Spanish.  Rabia y Acción is a 
publication for “anarcho-vegens for radical action” and its content mirrors that of English 
publications previously mentioned.  The June 2010 edition of Rabia y Acción includes 
editorials, contact information for and letters from prisoners, summaries of recent attacks, 
instructions for assembling incendiary devices, and even an interview with Ronnie Lee, 
the founder of the ALF in Great Britain.  These magazines report past actions and focus 
on operational tactics and techniques for future direct action. 
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Table 5.   The ALF Strategic Frames240 
Identity 
Frames 
ALF activists are compassionate people who put their own freedom on the line for animals who cannot 
fight for it themselves.  ALF activists are today’s Boston Tea Party and Underground Railroad.  Referring 
to ALF activists as terrorists trivializes real terrorism and clouds the true nature of the ALF.   
ALF member pattern themselves after the freedom fighters in Nazi Germany who liberated war prisoners 
and Holocaust victims and destroyed equipment that Nazis used to torture and kill their victims. 
Other comparisons include anti-apartheid movement and struggle by Palestinians against Israeli 
oppressors. 
The animal liberation movement has important similarities with some of the great freedom fighters of the 
past two centuries and is akin to contemporary peace and justice movements in its quest to end bloodshed 










Short term aim – save as many animals as possible and directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse. 
Long term aim – end all animal suffering by forcing animal abuse companies out of business 
- To liberate animals from places of abuse, i.e. laboratories, factory farms, fur farms, etc, and place them 
in good homes where they may live out their natural lives, free from suffering. 
- To inflict economic damage to those who profit from the misery and exploitation of animals 
- To reveal the horror and atrocities committed against animals behind locked doors, by performing non-
violent direct actions and liberations 
 - To take all necessary precautions against harming any animal - human and non-human 
- To analyze the ramifications of any proposed action and never apply generalizations (e.g. all ‘blank’ are 
evil) when specific information is available 
May also use intimidation to prevent further animal abuse and murder. 




The animal liberation movement will end when animal exploitation ends. 
Motivational 
Frames 
If not you, who?  If not now, when?  Support the animal liberation front. 
When the law is wrong, the right thing to do is break it.  This is often how moral progress is made in 
history, from defiance of American slavery and Hitler’s anti-Semitism to sit-ins and “whites only” lunch 
counters in Alabama. 
Animals are freed, not stolen…and when one destroys the inanimate property of animal exploiters, one is 
merely leveling what was wrongfully used to violate the rights of living beings. 
 
The ALF’s strategic frames in Table 5 reveal a medium degree of internal 
resonance.  The ALF’s frames intend to instill a “liberator” identity among members; 
philosophical narratives are laced with comparisons between ALF activists and history’s 
freedom fighters.  The problem, according to the ALF, is animal suffering, and 
organizations that contribute to animal suffering are the ALF’s targets.  The ALF’s goals 
and guidelines are simple and enduring.  What is most notable, however, is the 
inconsistency between prognostic frames and actions, weak maintenance frames, and 
limited motivational frames.   
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The NAALPO website explains that “because the ALF operates 
anonymously, there is no way (emphasis added) to aid actions before they happen.”241  
Instead, one can help “by donating to legal defense funds of those who have been 
arrested…writing to prisoners, and speaking out in support of direct action at every 
opportunity.”242  This sympathetic support that the ALF seeks is important but it cannot 
directly help the ALF realize its goals.  The ALF website claims the ALF is a “non-
violent campaign,” but in fact the ALF’s actions are violent.  The ALF exists to conduct 
violent direct action; violent direct action is what separates the ALF from organizations 
such as the Humane Society and PETA.  Whereas environmental activists claim the 
planet will not survive if we do not act now, the ALF can provide no similar reason why 
animal suffering must be prevented immediately.  For the most part, the websites 
motivational frames simply tug at the heartstrings of the population and aim to justify 
civil disobedience. 
LeT’s strategic frames are stronger internally than those of the ALF, but 
they are also very different.  LeT’s frames appeal to the population’s sense of honor 
while the ALF’s frames appeal to the population’s sense of compassion.  LeT frames its 
struggle as one for human survival while the ALF frames its struggle as one for animal 
survival.  Both organizations frame their identity as liberators, but while LeT is 
concerned about liberating people, the ALF aims to liberate animals.  The subject (human 
or animal) that each organization defends suggests that LeT’s frames have a higher 
degree of external resonance; after all, people are the target of ALF frames.   
Perhaps the most telling belief expressed by ALF inspirational leaders is 
that the animal liberation movement is similar to history’s relatively successful insurgent 
movements.  The NAALPO website states:   
 
 
                                                 




Whatever animal exploitation industries and governments take against the 
animal liberation movement, they will no more stop it than U.S. soldiers 
were able to quell North Vietnamese armies or the resistance movement 
spreading throughout Iraq, or the Israelis can stop the Palestinians in their 
efforts to achieve their goals.”243   
This statement highlights the contradiction between the ALF’s strategic frames and its 
structure.  The “resistance movements” that the press office refers to in this statement 
were centralized hierarchical organizations.  These insurgent organizations had high 
degrees of operational leadership, while the ALF does not.  
d.  Operational Leadership 
There is no evidence that points to any individual as an operational leader 
of the ALF in Mexico.  Evidence obtained through arrests has been insufficient for law 
enforcement authorities wishing to gain fidelity on organizational leadership.  Evidence 
gained thus far has only aided in the prosecution of a limited number of direct action 
cases.  It is likely that the ALF cells in Mexico are similar to those of the ELF in the U.S., 
but direct action in Mexico appears to be coordinated to some degree.  It may appear this 
way because activists inspire each other through their direct actions.  Given the close 
connections between various movements in Mexico and the young ages of the activists, 
the organization may very well be coordinated from university campuses.  Figure 11 
depicts the relationship between inspirational and operational leadership of the ALF in 
Mexico.  The ALF has a much lower degree of operational leadership in Mexico than 
LeT has in India.   
 
Figure 11.   ALF Mexico Leadership Relationship 
                                                 




The ALF has achieved a very low degree of effectiveness in Mexico; the 
organization has only succeeded in attacking its adversaries (see Figure 12).  Despite the 
recent surge in attacks, the ALF’s adversaries and the government show no signs that 
they consider the ALF relevant.  Clearly, the priority of the Mexican government is to 
defeat the drug cartels that have caused the most significant violence.   
 
Figure 12.   ALF Mexico Effectiveness 
LeT has achieved a slightly higher degree of effectiveness than the ALF in the 
broad and shallow environment.  LeT has a more hierarchical structure, relatively equal 
connectivity, stronger strategic frames, and a higher degree of operational direction from 
leaders within the organization than the ALF does.  The higher degree of operational 
direction within LeT is reflective of its centralized command structure, but still the 
organization is only slightly more effective than the ALF.  Relevance is ultimately 
determined by the social movement organization’s antagonist.  LeT directly challenges 
the authority of the Indian government; it presents a significant threat to those with power 
in India.  Furthermore, those in power can easily recognize LeT because LeT looks like 
the Indian government with its hierarchical and centralized structure. 
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IV. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES–NARROW AND SHALLOW 
A. STOP HUNTINGDON ANIMAL CRUELTY–CANADA 
In this section, we examine Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) to 
determine the degree of operational leadership within the organization and the impact it 
has on SHAC effectiveness in Canada.  First we provide an overview of SHAC and its 
direct actions in Canada.  Next we examine the political opportunity structures available 
to SHAC in Canada given the Canadian government’s capacity.  The remainder of the 
chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational effectiveness.  Our analysis 
demonstrates that SHAC has a very low degree of operational leadership and is largely 
ineffective in Canada. 
1. Overview 
SHAC was founded in Great Britain in 1999 by Greg Avery and Heather 
James.244  Avery and James were inspired to start the organization after seeing a PETA 
video, aired on British television, documenting the abuse of lab animals inside 
Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), “one of the largest contract animal-testing laboratories 
in the world.”245  SHAC targets HLS, companies that do business with HLS, and 
employees of both.  SHAC has also targeted shareholders of HLS stock.  Targeting 
people makes SHAC unique among the radical animal rights groups. 
SHAC primarily uses intimidation as a means to achieve its objectives.  
Operatives investigate their targets and distribute personal and financial information on 
those targets, “information that could only by known by a true stalker.”246  Operatives 
have been known to post “the home addresses and phone numbers of HLS employees” 
and associates employees on its website.247  SHAC has threatened female HLS 
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employees with sexual assault, followed them home from work, and sent e-mails to 
families asking “Do you know where your children are?”248  Members have targeted 
individual homes with protests, graffiti, vandalism, and kinetics; SHAC firebombs and 
letter bombs have injured several.249  SHAC has also demonstrated its capacity to disrupt 
the communications networks of its targets.  In July 2002, “over 2 million e-mails were 
sent through” a HLS associate’s computer system, compromising the server and 
damaging the company’s operations.250  SHAC is also known to continuously place 
telephone calls to targeted companies in order to disable voice communications.   
SHAC has been most active in Europe and the U.S. with the support of 
underground animal rights groups such as the ALF and the ELF.  The ALF has engaged 
in direct action against HLS and its associates throughout the world, but its actions have 
been limited in Canada.  Between 2005 and 2010 the ALF executed 33 attacks in Canada 
but only six of those targeted HLS or its associates.  Most of the ALF’s attacks in Canada 
targeted furriers or aimed to liberate animals, such as minks, from captivity.  The limited 
number of ALF attacks against HLS associates in Canada consisted of vandalism or 
graffiti on employee’s private vehicles and homes.  SHAC activists in Canada typically 
conduct protests, small-scale sabotage, vandalism and graffiti in the Montreal and 
Vancouver areas.   
SHAC’s direct actions in Canada do not compare in violence or effectiveness to 
attacks against HLS in the U.S. and Europe.  For example, one attack in the U.K. targeted 
a Cannacord251 executive over the company’s relationship with Phytopharm, an associate 
of HLS.  In May 2005 the ALF claimed that it had placed an incendiary device 
underneath the executive’s car in the garage at his private residence in London while he 
and his family slept inside.252  The car caught fire and the executive and his family 
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subsequently went into hiding.  In June 2005 Cannacord dropped Phytopharm as its 
client.   This type of attack is more representative of SHAC’s direct actions in the U.S. 
and U.K., but it remains to be seen in Canada. 
In November and December 2006 the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 
raided the homes of and arrested three “organizers of the Montreal chapter” of SHAC, 
and they also arrested eighteen protesters at SHAC demonstrations during a one month 
span.253  “Material related to the [SHAC] campaign was confiscated by law enforcement, 
including close to five thousand dollars in donations.”254  Names of the “organizers” 
were not released.   
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
a.  Breadth 
Canada is best categorized as narrow.  In 2002, Canada had 58,422 total 
police officers or 186 police per 100,000 people.255  The police per capita figure of 186 is 
well below the median (288) for countries that reported this data to the World Bank in 
2002.256  Canadian police maintain a persistent and visible presence in urban centers; 
however, Canada has some large areas that are sparsely populated.  Canada had a density 
of 0.01 police per square kilometer in 2002.257  This figure is well below the median of 
0.31.258   
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b.  Depth 
Canada’s capaicty is also categorized as shallow.  The most recent law 
enforcement score for Canada, assessed within the last five years, is 58, which is slightly 
below the median of 60.259  Canada’s tax effectiveness score is 75, which is well below 
the median of 88.260  The narrow and shallow capacity of the Canadian government 
suggests that Canada presents an ideal opportunity for militant activism, but the high 
degree of leadership that characterizes other regional SHAC chapters appears to absent in 
Canada. 
3.  Leadership 
SHAC is generally more organized than other violent organizations within the 
environmental and animal rights movements.  For the most part SHAC has visible 
leadership that inspires and directs campaigns to stop the exploitation of animals.  
Leaders have suffered the consequences of their structure and reaped the benefits; they 
have been targeted by the state and served time in prison, but they have also mobilized 
individuals to act against HLS.  In some countries SHAC’s leadership has effectively 
used its structure and connectivity to mobilize individuals to target HLS and its 
associates, but in other countries, like Canada, leadership has been less effective.   
a. Organizational Structure 
SHAC is a legal, conspicuous, and hierarchical organization headquartered 
in the U.K with offices or chapters in various countries throughout the world.  Each 
SHAC chapter has a president who also acts as chief spokesperson for the organization.  
Some chapters have campaign coordinators.  Police in the most active countries, such as 
the U.K., “suspect there are only about 20 to 25 SHAC activists willing to risk 
imprisonment for their cause.”  SHAC’s U.K. website is the only one that is currently 
operational; chapter websites in the U.S. and Canada have been taken off-line.  The main 
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website (www.shac.net) provides chapter contact information for prospective members 
around the world.  A 2004 federal indictment of SHAC-USA leaders sheds some 
interesting light on a typical chapter structure.  SHAC-USA is a “not-for-profit 
corporation incorporated under the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place 
of business located in New Jersey.”  Pamelyn Ferdin took over as president of SHAC-
USA for Kevin Jonas,261 who was one of six SHAC activists convicted of multiple 
federal felonies including conspiring to incite others to break the law in March 2006.262  
The six conspirators are referred to as the “SHAC-7.”  As an above ground organization 
SHAC has access to significantly more resources than illegal organizations such as the 
ALF and ELF.   
b.  Connectivity to Existing Networks 
According to the Center for Consumer Freedom, SHAC has ties to several 
legal and illegal organizations.  One legal organization with which SHAC is connected is 
the Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine (PCRM).  The PCRM was founded 
in 1985 as a nonprofit organization that, according to its website, “promotes preventative 
medicine, conducts clinical research, and encourages higher standards for ethics and 
effectiveness in research.”263  Newsweek magazine noted, however, that “less than 5 
percent of PCRM’s members are physicians.”264  The Center for Consumer Freedom 
provides substantial evidence to support their claim that the PCRM is a “fanatical animal 
rights group.”  The PCRM openly supports SHAC and “even co-signed a letter with 
SHAC-USA’s [former president] Kevin Jonas…urging customers to boycott Huntingdon 
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Life Sciences.”265  In Eco-Terrorism, Liddick exposes the clear ties that PCRM has to 
PETA.  The PCRM and PETA provide money and a pool of animal rights sympathizers 
for SHAC to recruit. 
According to the federal indictment of the SHAC-7, SHAC enlists the 
support of illegal organizations, such as the ALF and ELF, to conduct direct actions 
against HLS.266  “At the national ‘Animal Rights 2001’ convention, SHAC underscored 
this relationship by sharing a table with the criminal ALF and its sister group, the 
ELF.”267  Current SHAC-USA president Pamelyn Ferdin’s husband is Jerry Vlasak, a 
North American ALF spokesperson and longtime animal rights activist.268  ALF’s diary 
of direct actions and the communiqués documented on the Bite Back magazine website 
lists HLS as the target of many ALF attacks.269  Another indication of SHAC’s 
connectivity to illegal social movement organizations can be found in their newsletter.  
Many of the “SHAC” prisoners listed in the SHAC Newsletters are from the ELF cell the 
“Family” discussed earlier.270   
c.  Inspirational Leadership 
Charismatic movement spokespeople use a growing body of literature on 
animal rights issues and attractive websites to inspire SHAC members.  A British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) report notes that police wiretaps of Greg Avery 
(founder and director of SHAC in the U.K.) and two others in the U.K. revealed that they 
meet “every three months to discuss their campaign with regular updates from colleagues 
in the U.S. and Europe.”271  This report suggests that inspiration for campaigns in Europe 
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and the U.S. is managed by Avery and others in the U.K.  SHAC newsletters are 
produced in the U.K. and made available to all SHAC chapters through the website.  
Avery uses these professionally produced media to disseminate current and relevant 
frames and mobilize animal rights sympathizers around the world to act in defense of 
animals.  Chapter presidents likely provide an additional degree of inspirational 
leadership for campaigns in their regions.  According to an anonymous contribution on 
the ALF website, Richard Leblanc is a spokesperson for SHAC Canada, but there is no 
evidence to indicate the degree of Leblanc’s influence within the Canadian organization.  
Inspirational leadership in Canada is likely very limited, yet this void is probably filled 
by the abundance of inspiration from outside sources previously discussed. 
Table 6.   SHAC’s Strategic Frames272 
Identity 
Frames 
SHAC is made up of compassionate people from all walks of life and people of all ages from children to 
pensioners.  All of us are outraged at the existence of HLS and all of us are doing as much as we can to 
make sure that this evil company is closed down for good. Two million members of the public have 
signed a petition to have HLS closed, thousands have protested.  The campaign involves thousands of 




HLS is the largest contract testing laboratory in Europe.  They have about 70,000 animals on 
site…destined to suffer and die in cruel, useless experiments.  HLS will test anything for anybody.  They 
carry out experiments which involve poisoning animals with household products, pesticides, drugs, 
herbicides, food colorings and additives, sweeteners, and genetically modified organisms.  Every three 
minutes an animal dies inside Huntingdon totaling 500 innocent lives every day.  They have been 
infiltrated and exposed at least seven separate times for disgusting animal cruelty…horrific evidence of 





Close down HLS through three tier approach.  Campaign against: 
- customers who provide HLS with an income and profits 
- suppliers who provide HLS with vital tools to carry out research 
- financial links such as shareholders, market makers and bargaining facilities 
The SHAC campaign is all about action.  Action is everything.  Words and tears mean nothing to the 
animals trapped in their cages inside HLS waiting to die. 
…Demonstrations, writing letters, making phone calls, sending emails or faxes, telling others about the 
campaign, distributing leaflets, fundraising, putting up posters and stickers.  Action is whatever you can 
do to shut down that hell-hole that is HLS. 
Maintenance 
Frames 
The government has failed to close HLS so it is up to each and every one of us to close them down.  The 
animals deserve nothing less than our utmost commitment to take action every day to close down the lab 
that holds them captive and slowly kills them. 
Motivational 
Frames 
SHAC has called on a mass boycott of HLS and is calling on all companies that do business with HLS to 
turn their backs on animal cruelty.  If you are happy to pay for, or profit from the cruelty HLS inflicts on 
innocent animals then you are just as much responsible as the vivisectors themselves.  We all have an 
important role to play, so please join us and help close down HLS! 
 
SHAC’s strategic frames outlined in Table 6 are consistent with its 
organizational structure and nature as a legal above ground organization.  SHAC claims 
its “campaign is all about action,” which it benignly defines as “demonstrations, writing 
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letters, making phone calls, sending e-mails or faxes, telling other people about the 
campaign, distributing leaflets, fundraising, [and] putting up poster and stickers.”273  The 
website is careful to note that it “does not encourage repetitive, rude or threatening phone 
calls and e-mails” and asks that members “make their point politely.”274  SHAC’s actions 
are quite different though.   
SHAC’s frames have a high degree of internal resonance, but they are 
inconsistent with direct actions carried out by SHAC.  A 2002 Boston Globe editorial 
declared “If SHAC activists seek to illuminate the condition of laboratory animals, they 
have failed.  Their own tactics reveal a disturbing willingness to inflict suffering.”275  
The ALF’s website notes that “while SHAC Inc. is an aboveground legal protest 
movement, the ‘SHAC movement’ sometimes resorts to illegal tactics such as property 
destruction to exert added pressure on HLS and its clients.”276  SHAC has focused their 
frames on soliciting legal support from animal rights sympathizers, but it relies on hard 
core activists in the ALF to carry out its violent and illegal direct action.  This 
inconsistency indicates that SHAC is a typical front organization for an illegal group and 
may explain why SHAC has not been able to mobilize a significant number of people 
outside of the existing underground animal rights organizations.  The most committed 
members of SHAC are in all likelihood also members of the ALF.  The fact that the 
president of SHAC-USA (a “former” ALF member) was convicted for his direct actions 
demonstrates that he was not able to mobilize others to act against HLS.  Both 
sympathizers and hard core activists can find information of value to them in SHAC’s 
newsletter and on its website.   
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d.  Operational Leadership 
SHAC appears to provide the operational leadership for the ALF through 
these media.  In his opening remarks to the jury in the SHAC-7 case, U.S. Attorney 
Charles B. McKenna referred to the defendants as “the commanders” who “got their foot 
soldiers to go out and to their dirty work.”277  Greg Avery provides broad operational 
direction for the greater SHAC organization by determining the targets that will be the 
focus of SHAC letter writing campaigns and direct action attacks.  The targets, or 
companies and their contact information are posted weekly on the SHAC website and in 
the SHAC newsletter.278  Recent targets include HLS customers Novartis, AstaZeneca, 
and Bristol-Myers Squibb, financiers Progress Funding and Sub Anchor, and suppliers 
Phenomonex and FedEx.279  Even detailed information on individuals has been posted in 
these sources in the past.  The website and newsletter are focused on operations in the 
Europe and the U.K., however, they do list target information in other regions.  These 
media do not describe the violent methods to be used against these targets; violent 
methods can be found at any number of other animal rights websites. 
 
Figure 13.   SHAC Leadership Relationship in Canada 
SHAC’s modus operandi suggests that some degree of coordination is 
required to effectively conduct a multi-pronged campaign against HLS, its associates, and 
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individuals through legal and illegal means, but there is no evidence of this coordination 
in Canada.  Gabriel Villeneuve launched the Canadian arm of SHAC in 2003.280  
Villeneuve was arrested on at least two occasions in 2008, and he was likely one of the 
three “organizers” arrested in Montreal in 2006.  Villeneuve claims he has been arrested 
over 70 times.281  He is “legally forbidden to be in contact with his comrades at SHAC 
Canada,” and in 2008 he noted that he would start up “another animal rights organization 
in the near future.”282  Villeneuve likely coordinates protests, but there is no evidence to 
indicate that he provides operational direction for direct action to SHAC activists in 
Canada.  Figure 13 depicts the low degree of operational direction within SHAC Canada. 
4. Effectiveness 
SHAC has achieved a medium degree of effectiveness in the U.K. and the U.S. 
but in Canada it has been largely ineffective (see Figure 14).  Operating in the U.S. and 
U.K. SHAC has made contact with its enemies, been deemed relevant by authorities, and 
coerced concessional change from HLS and its associates around the world.  On a global 
scale, SHAC has been quite effective in damaging HLS.  SHAC pressure in the U.K. 
caused HLS to relocate to the U.S. in 2001.283  HLS was dropped from the New York 
Stock Exchange because its share price had fallen significantly, but it has since made a 
return as Life Sciences Research Incorporated (LSRI) in 2009.  There is little financial 
data available on the company but it continues to trade on the exchange.   
HLS chief executive, Brian Cass, notes that the company has done well despite 
the ten-year campaign waged against them.  Cass asserts that the company has “doubled 
in size” since 2001 and is “solidly profitable.”284  But the company still has difficulty 
                                                 
280 Chris Barry, “Critter Crazy: Animal rights activist fights cruelty, often from behind bars,” 
Montreal Mirror, April 24–30, 2008, http://www.montrealmirror.com/2008/042408/people.html. 
281 Ibid.  
282 Ibid.  
283 Andrew Alderson, “Huntingdon Life Sciences to move back to UK after crackdown on animal 
rights militants,” UK Telegraph, January 17, 2009,  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-
order/4276369/Huntingdon-Life-Sciences-to-move-back-to-UK-after-crackdown-on-animal-rights-
militants.html. 
284 Alderson, “Huntingdon Life Sciences to move back to UK after crackdown on animal rights 
militants.”  
 83 
getting loans, and when it does, it is forced to pay unusually high interest rates.285  
According to John Lewis, deputy assistant director of the FBI, “about one hundred 
companies had stopped doing business with HLS as a result of SHAC intimidation, 
including Citibank, Merrill Lynch, Charles Schwab, and Deloitte & Touche.”  Bank of 
America and Goldman Sachs stopped doing business with HLS as well.286  SHAC’s 
website provides a link to a long list of additional companies that have ceased doing 
business with HLS as a result of its campaign.  These companies “were at one time 
associated with HLS either as shareholders, stockholders, market makers, suppliers or 
clients” and all have “made clear and unequivocal statements to SHAC stating that will 
never deal with Huntingdon ever again.”287 
 
Figure 14.   SHAC Effectiveness 
 
According to Villenueve, “Montreal is the North American capital for vivisection 
when it comes to pharmaceutical products.  There are over 50 companies affiliated with 
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HLS located [in Montreal].”288  Despite the apparent abundance of targets, SHAC and 
ALF actions against HLS in Canada have been very limited.  The low degree of ALF 
activism in Canada suggests that there may simply be a limited number of hard core 
activists there, but it is more likely that Villenueve has not been very effective at 
mobilizing them.     
SHAC’s decentralized organizational structure best explains its lack of 
effectiveness in Canada.  SHAC has not taken advantage of the opportunities afforded by 
Canada, a narrow and shallow state, to use a hierarchical organizational structure to 
mobilize underground activists.  SHAC Canada does not have a website, and there is little 
publication of targets in Canada on SHAC’s international website.  Direct action in 
Canada is best characterized as small scale and sporadic, therefore it has not gained the 
attention of potential recruits or the media.  Given the number of times he has been 
arrested, Villenueve likely devotes much of his efforts to evading authorities.  Perhaps if 
he were to focus his efforts on building a legal above ground organization, like those that 
exist in other less permissive environments, he may begin to see some success.  Unlike 
chapters in other countries SHAC Canada does not have a clear operational leader to 
coordinate direct action with underground organizations.  SHAC chapters in the U.K. and 
the U.S. have high degrees of operational leadership and ALF activism, and they have 
been more successful.  
B. JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH–INDONESIA 
In this section, we examine Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) to determine the degree of 
operational leadership within the organization and the impact that leadership had on JI 
effectiveness in Indonesia.  We will focus our study on the period when JI was most 
active, from 2000 to 2005 when violence between JI and the Indonesian government was 
at its peak.  First we provide an overview of JI by describing its origins and the direct 
actions it conducted during the aforementioned period.  Next, we examine the political 
opportunities available to the JI given the Indonesian government’s capacity.  The 
remainder of the chapter focuses on the impact of leadership on organizational 
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effectiveness.  Through the lens of the political process model our analysis demonstrates 
that the JI has a moderate degree of operational leadership and a moderate degree of 
effectiveness.   
1. Overview 
Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was founded in January 1993 at Camp Saddah, a mujahidin 
training camp in Afghanistan set up by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a close affiliate of Osama 
Bin Laden.  JI traces its roots back to the Darul Islam (DI), an Islamic organization 
founded in the 1940s dedicated to the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia.289  While 
JI shares this vision of an Islamic state of Indonesia, its ultimate goal is to establish a pan-
regional caliphate in Southeast Asia.290   In October 2002, the United States designated JI 
a foreign terrorist organization.  The United Nations (U.N.) subsequently placed JI on the 
proscribed entities list, which requires all U.N. members to freeze assets, deny funding, 
and restrict travel to JI members.  JI has been active in several regional conflicts but 
became active in terrorist attacks in 2000, culminating in the second Bali bombing on 
October 1, 2005.  
Prior to 2000, the violence committed by JI was restricted to communal fighting 
aimed at fueling anti-Christian sentiment.  However, in 2000, JI began to carry out more 
significant terrorist attacks.  The first occurred in August 2000 with the attempted 
assassination of the Philippine ambassador to Indonesia followed by attacks on 38 
churches throughout Indonesia on December 24, 2000.  The church attacks, known as the 
Christmas Eve bombings, left 19 people dead and 120 injured. In August 2001, the 
Atrium Mall in East Jarkarta was bombed.  This attack was aimed at a Christian group 
that was meeting in a rented room of the second floor of the mall.291 As violent as these 
attacks were, they were only precursors to JI’s most violent and lethal phase from 2002–
2005. 
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JI began its most active phase with multiple bomb attacks on October 12, 2002, 
on the island of Bali.  In all, three bombs were detonated: the first was a small bomb 
placed inside a bar, the second was placed in a van outside a nightclub, and the third was 
placed on a street curb near the U.S. consulate.  In all, 202 people were killed and over 
500 wounded in the attacks.  On August 5, 2003, JI operatives carried out another major 
attack in front of the J.W. Marriott hotel in downtown Jakarta resulting in 12 fatalities.  
On September 20, 2004, a minivan filled with explosives was detonated outside the 
Australian embassy, killing 9 people.  The final major attack by JI occurred on October 1, 
2005, when three suicide bombers attacked three different establishments on Bali, killing 
23 people.  In contrast to the attacks prior to 2002, these attacks were very sophisticated, 
calling for a high level of coordination and technical expertise and represents the peak of 
JI activity. 
2. Political Opportunity Structures 
Jemaah Islamiyah became most active at a time when the Indonesian government 
was extremely vulnerable.  The democratic government had only been in place since 
1998 and was still struggling to fix all the problems left by the previous Suharto regime.  
Corruption was rampant, and several ethnic groups seized the opportunity to mount a bid 
for independence.  The island of East Timor voted for independence in August 1999 and 
a bloody struggle ensued resulting in more than 7,000 East Timorese killed.292 The 
conflict continued until 2002 when East Timor gained its independence.  The region of 
Aceh also made a bid for independence around the same time.  An agreement signed in 
August 2005 granted partial autonomy to the region, but only after a bloody conflict, 
which claimed an estimated 15,000 lives.293  This instability opened up an opportunity 
for radical groups such as JI to operate relatively free of government interference. 
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a.  Breadth 
In terms of breadth, Indonesia is categorized as narrow.  In 2004, 
Indonesia had 285,000 police or 120 police per 100,000 people.294  The police per capita 
figure is well below the median of 288 per 100,000 people as reported by the World Bank 
in 2002.295  Indonesia had 0.15 police per square kilometer, less than half of the median 
of 0.31 police per square mile as reported by the Work Bank.296  Geographically, 
Indonesia is a highly fragmented state, encompassing 17,508 islands of which 
approximately 6000 are inhabited.297  The Indonesian government has struggled to 
control ethnic and religious violence on several islands, including the island of Aceh, 
which had sought independence.  On August 15, 2005, the Indonesian government 
reached a peace agreement with Aceh, giving it considerable autonomy but not full 
independence.298 
b.  Depth 
In terms of depth, Indonesia is characterized as shallow.  The democratic 
government was only weakly consolidated in 2002, having only been in place since 1998 
after the fall of the authoritarian military regime of President Suharto.  Corruption was 
rampant, with Indonesia ranking as the seventh most corrupt nation in 2002 in a 
Transparency International study.299  Efforts to decentralize the government were poorly 
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managed and only exacerbated the problem, resulting in a “chaotic free-for-all.”300  
Under the Suharto regime, corruption was an entrenched part of political life.  It was 
expected that government entities such as the military would partially fund their 
operations through corruption.  This allowed Suharto to severely underfund the national 
budget.  As a result, the tax collection system in place once the democratic government 
took over was only minimally effective.301  This instability is reflected in the fact that 
Indonesia went through three presidents in the first six years of democracy. 
3.  Leadership 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was a founding member of JI and provided the inspirational 
leadership.  Ba’asyir was originally a member of DI who, along with Abdullah Sungkar, 
established a boarding school called Pesantren al-Mukmin in the Indonesian town of Solo 
in 1972.  The goal of this school was to establish a community of members committed to 
Sharia law and the establishment of an Islamic state and would serve as the basis for the 
establishment of JI.302  Sungkar initially held the title of amir until his death in 1999 
when Ba’asyir assumed the title. 
a.  Organizational Structure 
The organizational structure of JI is a hierarchical military style structure 
that is controlled by a governing council called the Markaz under the direction of the 
amir.303  The governing council is supported by consultative council called the Shura, 
which is further broken down into functional components (i.e., operations, finance, 
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recruiting) that assist the Markaz in the formulation of policy.304  JI is divided into 
regional commands called mantiqis, which cover the following areas:305 
Mantiqi 1: Singapore, Malaysia (excluding Sabah) and southern Thailand 
Mantiqi 2: Indonesia (excluding Sulawesi and Kalimantan) 
Mantiqi 3: Sabah, Sulawesi, Kalimantan, and the southern Phillipines 
Mantiqi 4: Australia and Papua 
Mantiqis are roughly equivalent in military terms to a brigade, which is 
further broken down into wakalah (battalions), khatibah (companies), qirdas (platoons), 
and fiah (squads).306 Figure 15 depicts the organizational structure of JI. 
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Figure 15.   JI Organizational Structure 
Although both SHAC and JI share a hierarchical structure, there are 
several key differences.  The first difference is that SHAC is a global organization, 
whereas JI is regional.  This makes physical communication and coordination as well as 
the sharing of resources easier for JI.  In addition, JI is a much larger organization, with a 
membership of around 2,000 activists and 5,000 sympathizers at its peak in contrast to 
the estimated 20 to 25 SHAC activists willing to take action in each country.307  The 
structure of JI is also more rigid and military-like, whereas SHAC resembles more of an 
international club, with chapters in each country.  This makes JI leadership and decision-
making more centralized in comparison to SHAC. 
                                                 
307  Chalk et al., The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia, 93. 
 91 
b.  Connectivity to Existing Structures 
In keeping with its goal of establishing a pan-regional caliphate in 
Southeast Asia, JI has ties to other radical Islamist groups in the region such as the Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines.  Until approximately the mid-2000s, 
when the Philippine government shut it down, JI and MILF operated a training camp 
together called Camp Abu Bakar.308 
JI has also maintained ties with al Qaeda since the early 1990s.  The 
relationship began when a JI member, Abdullah Sungkar, met with Osama bin Laden in 
Afghanistan some time around 1993–1994.  Since then, JI has benefitted from its 
relationship with al Qaeda through use of training facilities as well as financial 
support.309  During the early years of the organization, many JI operatives trained in al 
Qaeda run training camps in Afghanistan.310  Another JI member, named Hambali, is the 
only Southeast Asian member of the central council of al Qaeda.311 
Unlike SHAC, JI does not use ties to other organizations as a means of 
recruitment.  Instead JI uses these ties as a means of operational support, preferring to 
recruit from the Indonesian population, particularly those that have attended JI sponsored 
pesantren (boarding school).  SHAC has also co-opted affiliate groups such as ALF to 
conduct violent action against its primary target the HLS.  JI attacks were conducted 
exclusively by its own members. 
c.  Inspirational Leadership 
Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was a founding member of JI and provided the 
inspirational leadership.  His own statements appear to confirm this fact: “I make many 
knives and I sell many knives, but I’m not responsible for what happens to them.”312 
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Many JI operatives were students of the pesantren that he established with Abdullah 
Sungkar, which taught a very conservative version of Islamism.  JI’s basic ideology was 
that man was responsible for managing and enforcing God’s laws on earth.  Islam not 
only encompassed spirituality, but all other aspects of life as well including politics and 
society.  Muslims had lost their way in the face of secular ideologies, and must now seek 
to reunify religion and politics through the establishment of an Islamic state and 
ultimately a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia.313 
The creation of a pan-regional caliphate would occur in several stages.  
First, it would occur through the establishment of small Islamic communities, or Jemaah 
Islamiyah from which the organization derives its name.314  The second stage was the 
establishment of an Islamic state targeting the Indonesian government.  Finally, other 
states in the region would be targeted including Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Singapore.315 
Ba’asyir employed several methods to mobilize and recruit members.  As 
a predominantly Muslim country, efforts were made to exploit feelings of guilt for not 
living up to JI’s interpretation of “true Islam.”316 This message resonated with even 
moderate Muslims in Indonesia and had the effect of mitigating the public’s distrust of 
JI’s radical agenda.317 Internally, the promise of divine rewards and redemption 
resonated strongly with members, many of whom joined the organization for purely 
religious reasons, either as a “no fuss” path to heaven or out of an unselfish desire to help 
the “Muslim Nation.”318  Ba’asyir would also exploit the personal loyalty that develops 
between students and teachers in Southeast Asia as a means of mobilization in addition to 
ties of kinship and friendship.319  Members were taught to obey leadership through Amar 
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ma’ruf, nahi munkar (the code commanding good and forbidding evil).  When members 
did not obey leadership, they were told that they had committed a sin against God.  This 
concept was reinforced through the selective use of Islamic scripture that appeared to 
support these beliefs.320  Internal review mechanisms called hisbah were used, which 
were designed to control fluctuations in the commitment of members.321 Table 7 
summarizes the strategic frames used by JI. 
The main difference between JI and SHAC’s method of inspirational 
leadership lies in the legality of each organization.  As a legal above ground organization, 
SHAC is free to mount overt campaigns through newsletters and websites in an effort to 
mobilize the masses.  However, this inhibits its ability to communicate the violent side of 
its agenda.  In contrast, JI is an illegal underground organization, which did not seek mass 
mobilization, instead seeking to establish small religious communities.  Thus, JI was able 
to communicate its ideology in its entirety to a select group of people who were isolated 
in the pesantren from competing ideologies.  Combined with the robust structure that was 
put in place to maintain these ideologies, JI was much more successful at inspiring its 
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Table 7.   JI Strategic Frames 
 
d.  Operational Leadership 
While it has been established that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir provided 
inspirational leadership to JI, his operational role is less clear.  It is believed that 
Hambali, the head of Mantiqi 1 and mastermind behind the first Bali bombings, was 
responsible for the planning and field operations of JI.329  However, it now appears that 
the distinction between inspirational and operational leadership was less distinct.  After 
his capture in May 2002, Omar al-Faruq, the confessed mastermind behind the Christmas 
Eve bombings in 2000, revealed that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir played an active role in 
planning attacks by authorizing the use of JI personnel and resources.  According to al-
Faruq, Ba’asyir even went so far as to send aides to meet with al-Qaeda in order to 
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Identity 
Frames 
Muslims have lost their way since the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1924, which was the last true “Muslim 
Nation”.322 Modern secular ideologies have resulted in moral decay.  The Muslim Nation must be 




-The freedom to practice Sharia has been inhibited throughout our history by English, Japanese, and Dutch 
rule in Southeast Asia.323  







- The first step to establishing a pan-regional caliphate in Southeast Asia is the creation of small Islamic 
communities or Jemaah Islamiyah. 
- Second, a Daulah (Islamic State) in Indonesia must be established through jihad.325 
-The final step is the establishment of the pan-regional caliphate.326 
Maintenance 
Frames 
Peace can only be achieved if Islam is practiced in its totality, which encompasses all aspects of life: 




-God legitimizes actions against the Indonesian government. 
-By fighting in the name of Islam, one can do no wrong.  Divine retribution for those that do not comply, 
divine rewards for those that do comply.328 
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procure weapons and explosives for specific attacks.330 Figure 16 depicts the relatively 
centralized leadership structure of JI. This higher degree of centralization can be 
attributed to the narrow and shallow capacity of the Indonesian government. During the 
reign of President Suharto, both Sungkar and Ba’asyir operated Pesantren al-Mukmin 
quietly and peacefully until they were drawn out into the open by an elaborate sting 
operation set up by Suharto’s intelligence czar in 1978.331 Both were subsequently 
arrested and released several years later, although plans to arrest Sungkar and Ba’asyir 
again caused them to flee to Malaysia in 1985.332 Sungkar and Ba’asyir returned in 1998 
after the collapse of the Suharto regime. The fragile new democratic government that 
took its place created an environment that allowed formerly restricted Islamic groups to 
operate freely, including JI.333 Thus, Sungkar and Ba’asyir were able to exercise more 
centralized control with little fear of repression. 
 
 
Figure 16.   JI Leadership Relationship 
The moderately centralized leadership of JI stands in contrast to the 
decentralized leadership of SHAC in Canada.  Given the specificity of SHAC’s target 
(HLS people and property) the requirement for centralized leadership is less than what JI 
required.  For JI, what constituted an effective target was less clear, and thus required 
more direction. 
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4. Effectiveness 
On Einwohner’s scale of effectiveness, JI was marginally successful, achieving a 
score of 3 (social movement organization is invited to give input on an issue centrally 
related to its concerns, see Figure 17).   While the majority of Muslim Indonesians are 
moderate and do not agree with JI’s agenda, Islamic political parties have enjoyed some 
success.  Following elections in 1999, the Partai Bulan Bingtan (PBB) introduced two 
bills, which were influenced by Sharia law.  The first bill was a revision of the criminal 
code and would have made acts such as adultery and homosexuality illegal.  The second 
bill would have made proselytizing, conversion, and inter-faith marriage illegal.  In 
addition, the bill made the commemoration of religious holidays a legal obligation.334  
While these bills were not successful, Article 31 of the Indonesian constitution, which 
addresses the national education system, acknowledges “the necessity of religious values 
in the development of Indonesian civilization.”335 
 
Figure 17.   JI Effectiveness 
Islamist political parties have also gained increasing success in local elections by 
running on a platform of anti-corruption.  Districts that elected Islamic party 
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representatives in the 1999 elections experienced a relative decline in corruption while 
districts that elected secular representatives experienced a relative increase.  The result 
was that in the 2004 elections, citizens living in districts where corruption increased 
voted out their secular representatives and elected Islamic party representatives.336 Thus, 
the Indonesian government has not been entirely free of Islamic influence despite being a 
secular democracy. 
The success of JI can be attributed to a moderate degree of centralized leadership 
combined with the strong internal and external resonance of JI’s strategic frames.  
Centralized leadership resulted in the creation of a strong support structure to maintain 
the group’s ideology among its members.  Intense indoctrination in an isolated 
environment aimed at only a select group of individuals who were already seeking a 
religious education meant that JI’s strategic frames had a strong internal resonance.  As 
the nation with the world’s largest Muslim population, JI’s Islamic message resonated 
strongly with many Indonesians outside the organization.  This strong external resonance 
can still be seen today with the involvement of various Islamic political parties in the 
government. In contrast, GI leadership was significantly more decentralized and suffered 
from weak internal and external resonance. GI’s attempt to co-opt people that did not 
fully share GI’s strategic frames meant that more centralized leadership was required to 
mobilize support. Unfortunately for GI, it lacked the centralized leadership necessary to 
maintain the group’s ideology like JI had. The result is that JI enjoyed a greater degree of 
success when compare to GI. 
The relative success of JI when compared to SHAC in Canada is a result of 
leadership and resonance.  For SHAC, there is no indication that Gabriel Villeneuve has 
managed to set up any operational structure, instead relying on the individual decision to 
act.  As a legal organization, SHAC in Canada was limited to public calls for non-violent 
action and lacked a covert structure that could disseminate the violent agenda that set it 
apart from peaceful animal rights groups.  To do so would have required some degree of 
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operational leadership that SHAC did not have.  In many respects JI was the complete 
opposite, with a clear operational and inspirational structure that ensured a high degree of 
resonance amongst its members. 
 99 
V. CONCLUSION 
The intent of this thesis was to identify the conditions under which a leaderless 
social movement organization will be more or less effective.  We made the distinction 
between operational and inspirational leadership and defined a “leaderless” social 
movement organization as one that has a low degree of operational leadership.  In order 
to assess effectiveness, we utilized a scale based on seven indicators developed by 
Einwohner in her study of animal rights campaigns.  This scale recognizes that 
effectiveness cannot be quantified merely by whether or not a social movement 
organization has achieved its stated goals, and allows us to assess effectiveness with 
higher fidelity. 
In testing our hypotheses, we chose a wide variety of case studies, which 
encompassed organizations with varying degrees of leadership in a variety of 
environments.  By studying a broad range of leaderless organizations, we have addressed 
a shortcoming in the work of scholars such as Marc Sageman, who have focused on 
specific organizations such as al Qaeda but failed to identify the underlying conditions 
that make leaderless social movement organizations effective.  The conclusions that we 
draw can be applied more broadly and allow a more nuanced approach to addressing 
leaderless social movement organizations.  Suggestions such as “leaderless jihad should 
be allowed to expire on their own”337  are incomplete, narrow, and only consider the 
structure of the organization without taking into account the effect of the environment in 
which they operate.  From our case studies, it is clear that effectiveness is determined by 
many factors both internal and external to the organization.  Understanding these factors 
will allow states to better address the threat of violent leaderless social movement 
organizations by tailoring responses to take advantage of their strengths and compensate 
for their weaknesses. 
Social movement organizations structure their organization based on the capacity 
of the state in which they operate.  As state capacity increases, the optimal degree of 
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operational leadership decreases.  This is a rational decision based on the costs associated 
with a high degree of operational leadership that a state with a high capacity can impose.  
Increased state capacity is associated with an increased ability to repress, allowing the 
state to “decapitate” a centralized organization with ease.  Conversely, a social movement 
organization has less to fear from a state with a low capacity to repress, allowing for a 
more structured and centralized organization.  This tendency is demonstrated in our case 
studies, where there is a trend towards more centralized operational control as state 
capacity decreases.  On one end of the spectrum, we see a clear distinction between 
operational and inspirational leadership and a more decentralized structure for both ELF 
and GI operating in states that are broad and deep.  On the other end of the spectrum, we 
see more of an overlap between operational and inspirational leadership or a more 
centralized structure for JI operating in a state that is narrow and shallow.  This is not to 
say that a leaderless organization cannot operate in environments other than broad and 
deep, rather that conditions in a broad and deep environment prevent an organization 
from being effective with a centralized structure due to the repressive capabilities of the 
state. 
Our case studies also indicate that the decision to become more leaderless is 
independent of the goals of the social movement organization.  We reference Gamson’s 
distinction between reform and revolutionary movements and test cases that fit both types 
(see Table 8).  There are organizations with relatively low degrees of operational 
leadership for both types of movements in each category of state capacity, and results of 
our analysis lead us to conclude that the degree of leadership is not dictated by the types 
of goals that organizations pursue, nor do the types of goals significantly impact 
organization effectiveness.  According to Gamson, reform organizations are generally 
more successful than revolutionary organizations.  Our case studies show that this 
conclusion does not hold true for organizations with low degrees of operational 
leadership.  The degree of effectiveness is more dependent on the structure of the 




Table 8.   Summary of Degrees of Leadership 
 
 
We acknowledge the difficulty in defining effectiveness when it comes to social 
movement organizations.  Defining a movement as effective only if it has achieved its 
goals is dichotomous and insufficient.  Members of a movement may consider an 
organization effective if it simply continues to exist and to inspire action.  In addition, 
any concession by the antagonist may be considered effective in moving the organization 
towards its ultimate goal.  For example, JI can be considered effective in that Islamic 
inspired legislation was introduced into the secular Indonesian government, moving it 
one step closer to an Islamic state.  In an attempt to quantify the varying degrees of 
effectiveness we use Einwohner’s seven indicators.  However, in doing so, we do not 
imply that a low score on this scale means that the organization does not consider itself 
effective.  Nevertheless, it is a useful tool for outsiders to evaluate social movement 
organizations. 
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Figure 18 shows the variables that enhance organization effectiveness along a 
spectrum of state capacity.  The key factor to effectiveness for organizations with a low 
degree of operational leadership is frame resonance.  As previously noted, states that are 
broad and deep preclude a high degree of operational leadership.  In the absence of 
centralized leadership, which would keep an organization operationally focused on 
achieving the organization’s goals, leaderless organizations rely on strong frame 
resonance as the “glue” that keeps the decentralized organization together.  As a result, 
frame resonance takes on an even more important role in keeping a decentralized 
organization together.  However, strong frame resonance can only achieve so much.  ELF 
exhibited a high degree of frame resonance compared to GI, which had relatively weak 
frame resonance.  GI had to work much harder than the ELF to achieve the same degree 
of effectiveness.  ELF’s lack of operational leadership was offset to some degree by the 
resonance of its message which inspired only the truly committed to action, whereas GI’s 
attempt to co-opt those not truly committed to the cause met with failure.   
 
Figure 18.   Effectiveness Factors 
The key factor to effectiveness for organizations with a high degree of operational 
leadership is the centralized structure itself.  In narrow and shallow states increased 
centralization comes with little cost and more effectiveness.  States that are narrow and 
shallow provide the most permissive environment in which to operate, yet SHAC was 
unable to move past contact, while JI, which exhibited the highest degree of operational 
leadership in our case studies, was able to achieve consultancy.  The JI case study also 
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indicates that centralized organizations in a permissive environment can mobilize 
collective action with moderate frame resonance.   
Determining how a state should proceed against a leaderless social movement is a 
multi-step process.  The first step is to determine the degree of operational leadership that 
the organization has.  All social movement organizations desire a high degree of 
inspirational leadership and high frame resonance to mobilize individuals, but they vary 
in the amount of operational direction they require.  Discovering the actual structure of an 
organization can be difficult.  
Inspirational leaders may be easier to identify, as they may be likely to make 
public statements as a way to frame the movement’s ideology and attract new members.  
Multiple inspirational leaders in organizations such as the ELF may indicate a more 
decentralized structure without having to determine the degree of operational leadership.  
However, organizations with a single inspirational leader such as JI require more in-depth 
intelligence collection by the state in order to determine the degree to which inspirational 
and operational leadership are centralized.   
Determining operational leadership may be more challenging, as the agendas of 
violent social movement organizations means that operations must be carried out away 
from the visibility of the state.  Thus, operational leaders are less likely to publicly 
declare how and when specific targets will be attacked for fear of being thwarted by the 
state.  The secretive nature of exercising operational leadership in violent social 
movement organizations requires a more robust intelligence capability by the state.  
Otherwise it will be difficult to determine the actual degree of operational control. 
The second step is to determine the capacity of the state. We used both 
quantitative and qualitative data to determine state capacity, including the ability to 
collect taxes, police per capita, and country studies conducted by private organizations 
such as the Bertelsmann Stiftung. Quantitative data on every nation has become 
increasingly available, making the evaluation of state capacity easier. However, 
qualitative considerations should not be completely discounted in order to provide a 
complete picture of state capacity that numbers alone cannot provide. 
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The strategy that we recommend to counter violent social movement 
organizations focuses on the “glue” that holds the movement together under different 
state capacities (see Table 9).  States that are narrow and shallow allow for centralized 
leadership and a more hierarchical structure.  Resonance plays a secondary role, as 
leadership can be more coordinated to keep the organization intact.  Members do not 
necessarily need to be “true believers” because the leadership can tailor frames and 
operations in order to mobilize people with other grievances.  Thus, narrow and shallow 
states should target the structure of the organization.  Leaders, brokers, finances, and 
communications are all valid targets in such a strategy, as the removal of these 
institutions would have a major impact on the capacity of the organization to carry out 
further operations.  In contrast, a decentralized organization would have multiple cells 
each with their own set of these institutions so that it could operate independently. 
Table 9.   Strategies to Limit Social Movement Effectiveness 
 
 
On the other end of the spectrum, states that are broad and deep should focus on 
targeting the social movement organization’s frames.  Since social movement 
organizations can only continue to survive in a broad and deep environment by 
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decentralizing, the resonance of strategic frames serves as the “glue” that keeps the 
organization together.  Targeting the structure of a highly decentralized organization 
would have little effect, as each cell is designed to operate independently.  Infiltration is 
an option, as it eventually brought down the “Family” cell within the ELF, but given 
security measures it is a highly risky and difficult technique to rely on.  Thus, information 
and psychological operations become the tactics of choice with the goal of decreasing the 
external resonance of the movement’s message.  Such tactics can be overt information 
campaigns consisting of black and/or white propaganda to counter the frames.338  The 
broad and deep state tends to rely on its repressive capabilities to demobilize social 
movement organizations, however, increased repression can fuel mobilization.  The 
broad and deep state should instead develop competing frames to compromise the 
inspirational leader’s legitimacy, highlight the futility of the organization’s prognostic 
frames, and promote the possibility of change through nonviolent prognostic frames.339 
For states with capacities that fall in between these two extremes, a strategy that 
targets both the structure and frames should be used.  The organization should be 
evaluated to determine the resonance of frames and degree of operational leadership.  If 
resonance is strong, then the state should weigh its strategy towards countering frames.  If 
there is a high degree of operational leadership, then the state should weigh its strategy 
towards dismantling the structure.  This is not to suggest that one strategy should be 
completely abandoned in favor of the other.  Rather, the response should be tailored to 
focus more on the aspect that acts as the dominant “glue” that keeps the organization 
together. 
Targeting structure or frames also plays to the strengths of each type of state 
capacity.  Narrow and shallow states more than likely enjoy only marginal legitimacy, 
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making it difficult to formulate a compelling counter-frame.  In addition, the state, 
because it is shallow, would be unable to infiltrate the organization to undermine it from 
the inside.  However, it would probably have enough military capability to physically 
target the structure.  Broad and deep states in general enjoy a higher degree of legitimacy, 
making it easier for them to formulate counter-frames that can effectively compete with 
those of the antagonist organization.  
We have two recommendations for further study.  Our case studies evaluate state 
capacity against violent social movement organizations over a relatively short period.  
State capacity is not static and can shift over time.  Newly created states can start off as 
narrow and shallow but can progress towards broad and deep.  Broad and deep states can 
lose legitimacy over time and move towards being narrow and shallow.  However, the 
exact order in which this transformation occurs in unknown.  How do states 
evolve/devolve along the scale of state capacity?  Does becoming narrow precede 
becoming shallow?  If a pattern can be found, then it would have implications for how 
states should shift their strategies over time.  If a narrow and shallow state perceives itself 
as getting broader and deeper, then it can expect that the social movement organization 
will decentralize and thus shift its strategy to countering frames.  If the state can 
anticipate that it will become broad before it becomes deep, then it knows that it will 
have the capability to overtly counter frames before it has the capability to carry out a 
covert counter-frame strategy through infiltration of the organization.  
Our second recommendation is to test our hypothesis on non-violent social 
movement organizations.  Leaderless social movements such as the Tea Party in the 
United States have been able to grow and gain political influence in a very short period of 
time.  Are non-violent movements more successful than violent movements?  Do non-
violent movements exhibit the same degree of leadership under different state capacities?  
Non-violent social movements may be able to gain greater success than their violent 
counterparts because few people are willing to take the extra step towards violence.  
Perhaps it is violence that is the key factor that influences potential resonance.  The 
strategies for countering non-violent social movements may be different as well.  Kinetic 
operations aimed at eliminating the structure would no longer be an option.  Therefore, 
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channeling or co-opting the organization may be most effective or an entirely different 
strategy may need to be developed.  Research into these two areas would provide a 
complete picture of how leaderless social movements operate in different environments, 
providing a starting framework from which policy makers can address almost any 
specific social movement. 
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